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THE PROPOSED MODEL SURROGATE PARENT-
HOOD ACT: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE
CHALLENGES OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Murray L. Manus*
In this Article, Manus proposes a Model Surrogate Parenthood Act.
He examines the medical and scientific history of surrogacy and
reviews the jurisprudence in the area, specifically the constitu-
tional relationship between procreation rights and surrogacy. The
author asserts that surrogate motherhood cannot be, and indeed,
should not be, eradicated through legislation criminalizing it. The
proposed Model Act, presented here in its entirety, attempts to
reduce the problems inherent in the concept of surrogate parent-
hood by putting the process under strict court supervision and by
zealously protecting the rights of the surrogate mother and the
child to be conceived.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, many couples incapable of having
children because of the wife's infertility-and who are either
unable or unwilling to avail themselves of alternative methods
of conception-have turned to surrogate mothers in order to
become parents.' Typically, the husband, but not his wife,
would enter into an agreement with another woman (the
surrogate), whereby the latter would be artificially insemi-
nated with his semen, become pregnant, carry the fetus to
term, and at birth, turn over the child to the infertile couple,
* B.A. 1975, University of Chicago; J.D. 1979, Stanford Law School; LL.M.
1995, De Paul College of Law. After practicing law for many years, I am currently the
law clerk for the Honorable Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, County Department, Chancery Division. Much of this Article grew
out of work I did while a student in the Health Law program at De Paul. I especially
want to thank my instructors, Ellen Bublick and Judge Stephen R. Yates, also of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for their wisdom, inspiration, and good cheer.
1. In 1990, it was estimated that 750 to 1000 live births occurred in the United
States through the use of surrogate mothers. ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRO-
DUCTION 75 (1990). Another source put the same figure at more than 2000 surrogate
mother births from 1987 to 1990 alone. Andrea Sachs, And Baby Makes Four, TIME,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 53. Whatever the current number, the use of surrogate mothers in
this country is rising. Thomas S. Bradley, Comment, Prohibiting Payments to
Surrogate Mothers: Love's Labor Lost and the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 719 (1987).
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relinquishing all of her rights as biological mother.2 In ex-
change, all of the surrogate's medical and pregnancy-related
expenses attendant to the pregnancy would be paid, and she
would usually, but not always, receive a fee of several thou-
sand dollars as well.3
Before the early 1990s no state or federal statutes had
addressed the validity of these surrogate arrangements. When
disputes began arising in the mid-1980s over the legality of
surrogate parenting contracts and over the right of the biologi-
cal father's wife to adopt the child, courts first attempted to
resolve these issues by looking for public policy guidelines as
evidenced primarily by a state's adoption laws and related
statutes. 4 The results have been inconsistent, however, even
where courts were interpreting identical provisions of states'
different adoption laws.5 The most influential case in this
2. For a general overview of surrogate motherhood and the issues it raises,
see MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIS L.
BREo, TuE SURROGATE MOTHER (1981); HELENA RAGONA, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, CON-
CEPTION IN THE HEART (1994); Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the
New Reproductive Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 50.
The wife is not usually a party to the surrogate motherhood agreement because
she will in almost all cases not be a biological parent of the child to be conceived. She
will have to adopt the child in order to become its legal parent after birth. Her
involvement in an arrangement where money is paid to a woman to obtain possession
of her child could easily run afoul of most states' statutory prohibition against
making such payments in connection with an adoption. John J. Mandler, Note,
Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family': A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1290 (1985). By omitting the wife's name from the
surrogate parenting contract, the parties are able to assert that she was not a
participant in the arrangement and did not make any payments to the surrogate
mother. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988); Katie Marie Brophy, A
Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 264 (1982).
3. It is not uncommon for the surrogate to be paid $10,000 or more for her
services in addition to reimbursement for all her expenses. BLANK, supra note 1, at
75. The total cost to the sponsoring couple usually ranges from $25,000 to $40,000
or $50,000. Id.; John Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Oct. 1983 at 28, 29; Patricia A. Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of a
New Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 6, 1983, at 76.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Compare In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1986) (ruling in favor of the surrogate mother) with In re Adoption of Paul,
550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990) (holding that renumeration paid to
surrogate violated New York public policy). See infra text accompanying notes 86-96.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, upheld a Michigan circuit court's judgment
that a surrogacy contract was void as against public policy. In re Adoption of K.F.H.
and K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Ark. 1993). The father had been given custody of
the twins born to the surrogate, although the court did award the surrogate visitation
rights. Id. The wife's adoption petition was granted subsequently without the sur-
rogate's consent because it was deemed to be in the children's best interests. Id. at
347.
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area, In re Baby M, arose in New Jersey in 1988,6 although a
recent decision of the California Supreme Court, Johnson v.
Calvert, might gain similar stature.7 Both rulings dealt with
a particularly troublesome issue: the conflict between the
sponsoring couple and the surrogate when the latter decides
that she does not want to surrender the child after it is born.
Aware of the judiciary's struggle in deciding these cases,
some states began considering legislation specifically ad-
dressing the validity of such parenting contracts and the
rights of the parties thereto.8 One such law was passed in New
York,9 which invalidates any type of contract involving surro-
gate mothers and provides substantial fines and criminal
penalties for a third party who assists in the formation of a
surrogate parenting contract for a fee. In contrast, a Virginia
law, permits surrogacy, provided.that no compensation is paid
to the surrogate, aside from reimbursement for expenses.' °
In August 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act ("Uniform Act")." The Uni-
form Act's purpose was to define the legal status of children
conceived through the use ofnoncoital reproductive techniques
such as artificial insemination, 2 in vitro fertilization, 3 and
6. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see infra text accompanying notes 97-132.
7. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see infra text accompanying notes 133-61.
8. Lori B. Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby M: Proposed State Laws on Surro-
gate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct./Nov. 1987, at 31; Linda D. Elrod &
Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 FAM. L.Q. 515, 559-60 (1994);
Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional
Problem? The Married-Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 498 (1991); Walter J.
Wadlington, Contracts to Bear a Child: The Mixed Legislative Signals, 29 IDAHO L.
REV. 382, 395-401 (1993).
9. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 121-124 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995). It seems likely that the
number of available surrogate mothers would be greatly reduced if they could not
charge a fee for their services. Robertson, supra note 3, at 32-33; Sharon L. Tiller,
Note, Litigation, Legislation and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate
Mother Arrangements, 72 IowA L. REV. 415, 433 (1987). One commentator has argued
that limiting or prohibiting the payment of fees to the surrogate infringes upon the
infertile couple's constitutional rights of privacy encompassing the right to procreate,
because it reduces their access to surrogate mothers. Bradley, supra note 1, at 732.
See infra text accompanying notes 210-14.
11. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9b ULA 161-76 (Supp.
1995). For a detailed analysis of the Uniform Act, see Massie, supra note 8, at
492-97.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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surrogacy.14 It proposed two alternative provisions with re-
spect to surrogate motherhood, one that made all such ar-
rangements unenforceable15 and another that permitted
surrogate parenting contracts, provided that they had been
judicially sanctioned prior to any attempt to conceive the
child.16 The Section of Family Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation also has adopted a separate Model Surrogacy Act,
which authorized surrogate parenting arrangements under
close judicial scrutiny.1
7
Bills to legalize commercial surrogacy have been introduced
in several states, including Illinois, California, and Michigan,
but none of them has become law.'" The California bill passed
both houses of the legislature only to be vetoed by Governor
Pete Wilson. 9 At least sixteen states have enacted legislation
on the subject of surrogate parenthood, but not one has legal-
ized explicitly the practice of commercial surrogacy, i.e., the
practice of paying the surrogate a fee and all of her expenses.2 °
14. Massie, supra note 8, at 490.
15. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, § 5, Alternative B.
16. Id. §§ 5-9, Alternative A.
17. MODEL SURROGACY ACT §§ 3, 5 (Section of Family Law, Am. Bar Ass'n 1988)
reprinted in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD app. IIIA (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). For other
proposed model surrogacy statutes, see Randall P. Bezanson et al., Model Human
Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act: An Act Governing the Status of
Children Born Through Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Arrangements, 72
IOWA L. REV. 943 (1987); Jamie Levitt, Biology, Technology and Geneology:A Proposed
Uniform Surrogacy Legislation, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 472-506 (1992);
Mandler, supra note 2, at 1299-1321.
18. In Illinois, Senator D'Arco introduced the Illinois Infertility Relief Act, S.B.
1510, 85th Gen. Assem. (1987), while Senator Marovitz sponsored the Surrogate
Parentage Act, S.B. 1111, the same day. Neither bill made it out of committee. FINAL
LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1988 SESSION OF THE 85TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF ILLINOIS (No. 12), VOL. 1 at 327, 437 (1989). For a discussion of Michigan
House Bill 5184, proposed in 1981 by Representative Richard Fitzpatrick in the 81st
Regular Session of the Michigan Legislature, see Tiller, supra note 10, at 439-43. For
information about the California bill, see Lori B. Andrews, Surrogacy Wars, CAL.
LAw., Oct. 1992, at 43, 46.
19. RAGONA, supra note 2, at 48. The California legislation was the most com-
prehensive to date, providing for payment of all the surrogate's medical and legal
expenses, requiring that life insurance be purchased for the sponsoring couple plus
health and life insurance for the surrogate, mandating psychological counseling for
all parties involved, and putting control of the pregnancy as well as the choice of
physician in the hands of the surrogate, among other provisions. Id.
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63.212 (Harrison 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-1 to 31-8-
1-5 (West Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West
1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200(1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to B:32 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124
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The statute books of most states are silent on the issue of
surrogate parenting. It is the intent of this Article to fill that
legislative void by offering a Proposed Model Surrogate Par-
enthood Act ("the Act"). Part I discusses the general medical
background of the field of assisted reproduction. It also ad-
dresses the question of why surrogate motherhood is used at
all when there are many other types of reproductive methods
available to solve the problem of infertility.
Part II shifts the focus from the biological environment of
surrogate motherhood to the jurisprudential one. It analyzes
several important cases decided over the past ten years in
which the courts had to grapple with the legality of this proce-
dure. The courts undertook this effort practically in a legal
vacuum because the state legislatures had not stayed abreast
of the most current technological developments in infertility
treatment that made surrogate motherhood possible. As a
result, the courts were forced to decide the legal issues before
them within the straitjacket of existing laws governing adop-
tion or the establishment of the legal relationship of parent
and child. For obvious reasons, none of these statutes was
enacted with the intent that it would apply to surrogate
parenthood. Part II ends with a detailed examination of the
two major decisions referred to above-In re Baby M,21 decided
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1988, and Johnson v.
Calvert,22 a 1993 opinion of the California Supreme Court.
This review of the principal case law in the surrogacy field
ultimately demonstrates that the judges themselves believed
that the policy questions raised by the surrogacy arrangement
should not be determined in a judicial forum but require
special legislative attention.
Part III of this Article discusses how constitutional rights in
the area of procreation, particularly the right to privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 might limit the scope of permis-
sible legislation affecting surrogate motherhood. This question
is analyzed under four different legislative scenarios: (1) where
(McKinney Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991 & Supp.
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-26.26.270 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-4-16 (1995).
Recently, two states, Iowa and Nevada, have amended their statutes on child-
selling or on payments for adoption to exclude surrogacy agreements from their
coverage. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.287 (1995).
21. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
22. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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surrogacy is banned outright; (2) where payment to the surro-
gate is prohibited; (3) where surrogacy is restricted to married
couples; and (4) where surrogacy is restricted to heterosexuals.
Against this background, Part IV introduces the model
statute itself. Part IV is intended to provide a summary of the
philosophy and goals of the proposed legislation, which takes
the approach that surrogate motherhood cannot be eradicated
(nor should it be) simply by making it illegal. Rather, it ac-
cepts the existence of surrogacy but attempts to obviate its
problematic aspects by putting the entire procedure under
strict court supervision and zealously protecting the rights of
the surrogate mother and the child to be conceived.
Finally, Part V presents the Proposed Model Surrogate Par-
enthood Act in its entirety. Each section of the Act is printed
in full, followed by commentary and analysis.
I. MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
In 1988, it was estimated that one couple in six was infer-
tile24 and two to three million couples wanted to have a child
but were unable to conceive.25 In an effort to have children,
these couples are increasingly turning to reproductive tech-
niques that medical science has developed.26 Commentators
attribute the demand for such reproductive techniques to
various circumstances: the fact that many couples delay having
children until the wife is in her mid- or late-thirties, which de-
creases her chances of becoming pregnant; the shortage of
children available for adoption; and the desire to have a child
who is biologically related to at least one of the parents.
24. BLANK, supra note 1, at 25; see also William W. Handel & Bernard A. Sherwyn,
Surrogate Parenting, TRIAL, Apr. 1982, at 57, 58 (finding 15 to 20% of couples infertile).
25. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, US. CONGRESS, OTA-BA-358, INFERTILITY:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3 (1988) [hereinafter OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT).
26. BLANK, supra note 1, at 25; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 25,
at 4-5. For an in-depth account of the development of assisted reproduction, see
Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519
(1990).
27. Alfred L. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption
Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547, 547 (1975) (discussing reasons for the shortage of children
to adopt); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 945-46 (1986) (discussing
reasons for the rise in infertility).
In 1984, it was estimated that more than two million couples vied for the 58,000
babies placed for adoption. Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy-
Proposed Surrogate Parenthood Act
The most widely used form of assisted reproduction is
artificial insemination.2" With this procedure, semen is depos-
ited by means of a syringe in or near the cervix of the woman's
uterus. Because the exact time of ovulation is unknown,
insemination is usually conducted on several consecutive days.
The success rate is seventy to eighty percent pregnancies
within three to four months of the start of treatment.29
There are actually two different types of artificial insemina-
tion, depending on who donates the sperm. Artificial insemi-
nation homologous (AIH) means that the woman's husband is
the sperm donor.3' This method is used when the husband has
a low sperm count and several ejaculations are pooled together
for insemination, or where the husband, for physical or psy-
chological reasons, cannot ejaculate during intercourse.31
Artificial insemination with donor (AID) usually involves using
an anonymous male's sperm that previously had been donated
to a sperm bank; AID also could encompass situations involv-
ing a known donor.32 AID primarily is used when the husband
is totally infertile or is known to suffer from a serious genetic
disease.3
When the woman is infertile because disease or infection has
scarred her oviducts and blocked the passage of the sperm to
the ovum, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is often used. IVF refers
to the procedure by which eggs are removed from a woman's
ovaries by inserting a needle guided by ultrasound imaging
through her vaginal wall, or less commonly by laparoscopic
surgery after she has been given hormone treatments that
Unfinished Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 777 n.10 (1993). By 1987, the ratio
had worsened to three million couples for 50,000 babies. Id. The adoption process itself
takes about seven years. Note, Surrogate Parenthood-An Analysis of the Problems
and a Solution: Representation for the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 143, 146 (1985).
One author claims that the adoption shortage only applies to "intelligent-looking"
Caucasian babies, and that comparatively speaking, there is no shortage of older
children or of Mexican-American, African-American, or retarded children to adopt.
Herbert T. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1983, at 35, 37.
28. BLANK, supra note 1, at 25. Blank estimates that more than 500,000 babies
have been born in the United States to mothers using this technique. Id.
29. Id. at 26.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 26-27. For further readings on the topic of artificial insemination, see
Kathryn V. Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation,
44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1643-53 (1984); Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The
Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 472 (1983).
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stimulate the ovaries to "superovulate."34 The eggs are then
fertilized outside the body in a petri dish, using her husband's
or a donor's sperm. 35 The resulting embryos are transferred
via catheter into the woman's uterus once they reach the four-
to eight-cell stage. 36 If successful, at least one embryo will im-
plant in the uterine wall within five days, and a pregnancy
will result.
3 7
There are two common variations on the IVF procedure
discussed above. Gamete intrafallopian transfer, also known
as GIFT, involves placing the sperm and the egg directly into
the fallopian tube where fertilization will occur. Several
religious groups, including the Roman Catholic Church, find
this method more acceptable than other forms on IVF because
fertilization takes place inside the body.3" The other variation
on IVF is called zygote intrafallopian transfer, commonly
known as ZIFT. Here, the embryo is placed in the fallopian
tube about eighteen hours after fertilization in vitro, after
which it travels to and implants in the uterine wall as in a
normal pregnancy.39
In any form, IVF has several significant disadvantages. The
hormone treatment that the woman undergoes can be very
unpleasant.4 ° In addition, the removal of her eggs through
laparoscopic surgery involves making abdominal incisions.
This may be painful, and it also implicates the risks associated
with any surgery done under general anesthesia.4 1 The whole
process is very expensive, costing $25,000 or more for a suc-
cessful pregnancy.4 2 Perhaps most important, IVF has a
success rate of only around twenty percent in achieving actual
pregnancies.43
34. BLANK, supra note 1, at 28.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; Cynthia Carver, The New--and Debatable-Reproductive Technologies,
in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 46, 52 (Christine Overall ed., 1989).
38. BLANK, supra note 1, at 28; Hey, supra note 27, at 785.
39. BLANK, supra note 1, at 28.
40. Carver, supra note 37, at 52; Laura Shanner, Powers-Over and Powers-To:
Human Reproduction and Insights From Taoism, 20 SECOND OPINION 11 (Jan. 1995).
41. Shanner, supra note 40, at 12; Robertson, supra note 27, at 943-44.
42. BLANK, supra note 1, at 30; Robertson, supra note 27, at 943 n.6 (estimating
that it would cost $38,000 for a 50% chance of a live birth).
43. Robertson, supra note 27, at 943 (reporting that the best IVF programs only
report 20-25% pregnancies per treatment cycle); see also BLANK, supra note 1, at 30
(14-17% pregnancies); Shanner, supra note 40, at 13 (18-22% pregnancies).
678
Proposed Surrogate Parenthood Act
A procedure similar to surrogate motherhood is surrogate
embryo transfer. It involves artificially inseminating a donor
woman with the husband's sperm, flushing the fertilized
embryo from her uterus via a procedure called uterine lavage,
and then implanting the embryo into the body of the infertile
wife." The key distinction between surrogate embryo transfer
and surrogate motherhood is that in the former the infertile
woman actually undergoes a pregnancy to term and delivers
a child, albeit one that has none of her genetic material, while
in the latter another woman performs that function for her.
With all of the other methods of assisted reproduction
available to them, why would an infertile couple enter into a
surrogate parenting arrangement?4" There are several possible
reasons. The couple may have tried one or more types of
assisted reproduction, gone through hormone treatments, or
even had surgery on their reproductive organs, all without
success. If the woman previously had a hysterectomy or has
suffered several miscarriages, pregnancy would not be a viable
option for her. Perhaps the wife has a genetic abnormality
that she fears she might pass on to her child.4" Under these
circumstances, surrogate parenting might be the couple's last
resort. Of course, they could try to adopt a child, but as dis-
cussed above, there are not enough children available for
adoption to meet the demand.47 In addition, an adopted child
has no biological relation to either parent, unlike the child
born to a surrogate who has been artificially inseminated with
the husband's sperm.
What has been discussed so far might be termed "tradi-
tional" surrogacy-an arrangement whereby the surrogate is
inseminated with the sperm of the husband, becomes preg-
nant, carries the fetus to term, and turns over the infant to
the sponsoring couple, thereby relinquishing all parental
rights.48 There is another type of surrogacy, however, which
would be especially appropriate for women who can get preg-
nant but cannot endure a pregnancy, such as a woman who
44. SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW
230-31 (1987); BLANK, supra note 1, at 31.
45. For a good discussion of couples' motivation for using a surrogate, see Robert-
son, supra note 3, at 29-30; Note, supra note 27, at 145-47.
46. For a detailed description of the process of genetic testing and its ramifica-
tions see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASSESSING GENmc RISKS: IMPuCATIONS FOR HEALTH AND
SOCIAL POLICY (Lori Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
47. See Hey, supra note 27, at 777 n.10. But see Krimmel, supra note 27, at 37.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
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always miscarries. Here, the woman's eggs can be fertilized by
her husband's sperm utilizing IVF. The resultant embryo is
transferred to the uterus of the surrogate, who becomes im-
pregnated thereby and gives up custody of the child after birth
as in the traditional arrangement.4 9
This type of surrogacy also would apply to the situation
where the woman has had a hysterectomy, including removal
of her ovaries. It is now possible to retrieve an immature egg
from the removed ovaries, mature it in a petri dish that
simulates the medium inside the ovary, and fertilize the now-
mature egg with donated sperm.5 ° The resultant embryo is
then implanted into the uterus of the surrogate.5 In both of
these situations it is clear that the surrogate's function is sole-
ly one of gestation; she simply carries another couple's child,
to whom she has no genetic relation, until it is ready to be
born.52
Surrogate motherhood also could be an option where the
husband and wife are both infertile. Under these circumstanc-
es, the surrogate could be artificially inseminated by sperm
from an anonymous donor and, in the reverse situation from
that described above, she would be carrying a child that has
her genetic material but none from the couple to whom she
will be relinquishing the baby.
There seems to be no discernible limit to the types of surro-
gate parenting arrangements.53 A recent example of a novel
49. BLANK, supra note 1, at 66; Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 760-62 (Ohio
1994).
50. Patricia Callahan, New Embryo Procedure Gives Hope, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23,
1995, § 2, at 1.
51. Id.
52. For additional commentary on gestational surrogacy, see George J. Annas &
Sherman Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects of
a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 216-222 (1983); Alice
Hofheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and
Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571 (1992); Robertson, supra note
3, at 33-34. The legal issues raised by this arrangement were addressed in the courts
for the first time with the California Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). See infra text accompanying notes 133-62. For additional
case law on the subject, see Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 760. See also Jeffrey M. Place,
Note, Gestational Surrogacy and the Meaning of "Mother": Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 907 (1994).
53. Professor Robertson states that through various combinations of artificial
insemination with donor, IVF, and surrogacy, there could be as many as six people
collaborating in the conception, bearing, and rearing of a child. John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA.
L. REV. 405, 423 (1983).
Proposed Surrogate Parenthood Act
approach involved five participants. An infertile California
couple had an adopted child and wanted to adopt another one
from the same birth parents so that both children would have
similar traits and characteristics.54 The birth parents agreed
to donate their sperm and ovum, which were fertilized in vitro,
and the resulting embryo was implanted into the uterus of the
adoptive father's daughter from a previous marriage. After
birth, the sponsoring couple planned to adopt the child and
become its legal parents.
55
These various surrogate parenting arrangements all have
one element in common: each involves a married couple that
is unable to have a child. There is certainly no biological
reason why single men or women could not avail themselves
of the services of surrogate mothers in order to become par-
ents, however. Nor can one ignore the question of whether
homosexual men and women also should have the right to use
the services of a surrogate for procreation. These and related
issues raised by the practice of surrogate motherhood are
examined in depth in the discussion in Part III of the constitu-
tional aspects of surrogacy.
II. ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the court system began to
address surrogate parenting practices. This involvement took
one of two forms. In some cases, courts were called upon to
approve a natural father's wife's adoption of a child born to a
surrogate." In addition, the judicial branch began to review
cases in which there was a conflict between the surrogate and
the infertile couple over custody of the child.57 As these judicial
decisions are examined below, note the similarity in themes as
the various courts struggle to analyze surrogate motherhood
within the framework of their existing laws.5"
54. California Baby Is Group Effort, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1993, § 1, at 3.
55. Id.
56. See In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990); In re Adop-
tion of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
57. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
58. The courts' most common mode of analysis is to apply their state's adoption
laws. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) and dissenting opinions; In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988); In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y Faro. Ct. 1990); In re Baby Girl
L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y Sur. Ct. 1986).
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This Article will initially examine the first state supreme
court decision concerning the legality of the surrogate parent-
ing arrangement, a 1986 opinion of the Kentucky Supreme
Court.59 Next, this Article will compare two subsequent New
York decisions that reached opposite results even though
applying an identical statute.6 ° Finally, it will examine in
great detail the influential rulings in the Baby M"6 and John-
son v. Calvert62 cases.
The Kentucky Supreme Court set out the essential elements
of the dispute over the use of surrogates in Surrogate Parent-
ing Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong.63 In this
case, the Kentucky Attorney General sought to revoke the
charter of a company called Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc., a medical clinic that facilitated the formation of surrogate
motherhood arrangements. The suit alleged that the clinic
violated existing Kentucky statutes that (i) prohibited the sale,
purchase, or procurement for sale or purchase of any child for
the purpose of adoption; (ii) prohibited filing a petition for
voluntary termination of parental rights prior to five days
after the birth of the child; and (iii) specified that a consent to
adoption by the natural parent is not valid if given during the
same five-day period. 64 The Kentucky Circuit Court dismissed
the complaint, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed.65
The Kentucky Supreme Court stated in its decision that the
case was one of statutory interpretation, presenting the funda-
mental question of whether the activities of this medical clinic
should be construed as participation in the buying and selling
of babies.66 The court concluded that this operation did not
constitute the buying and selling of babies as there were
fundamental distinctions between surrogate parenthood and
the activities prohibited by existing Kentucky law.67 In the
court's view, the critical factor was the difference between a
pregnant woman who decides to put her baby up for adoption
59. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
60. In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990); In re Baby
Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
61. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
62. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1992).
63. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
64. Id. at 210.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 211.
67. Id.
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and a woman who chooses to be a surrogate mother.6" The
laws were designed to keep baby brokers from overwhelming
an expectant mother with financial inducements to part with
her child. 9 By contrast, the surrogate parenting arrangement
is entered into before the child is conceived.7 ° Whereas a
pregnant woman who agrees to surrender her child for adop-
tion might be motivated to avoid the consequences of an
unwanted pregnancy or the financial burdens of child rearing,
the primary motivation for the surrogate is to assist an infer-
tile couple in having a child that is biologically related to the
father.7 ' The court analogized surrogate parenthood to a situ-
ation where the husband is infertile and his wife conceives
through artificial insemination.72 It noted that no court had
ever suggested that artificial insemination would violate any
of the above cited laws or that it was against public policy,
even though artificial insemination "tampers with nature" to
the same extent that surrogate motherhood does."
The court had little difficulty analyzing the impact of the
Kentucky statute that governed the timing of the consent to
adoption and termination of parental rights.74 It ruled that
parties could not by contract vary the time periods that the
legislature had mandated.7" Therefore, as late as the fifth day
after birth, a surrogate mother would be free to change her
mind about turning over the child, regardless of the terms of
the surrogate parenting contract, which was voidable at her
election.76 In that event, the surrogate mother would be in the
same position as any other mother with a child born out of
wedlock; her parental rights and obligations and those of the
biological father would be governed by existing statutes.
77
Ultimately, the court upheld the legal legitimacy of the de-
fendant corporation in facilitating surrogate parenting ar-
rangements on the basis that no existing legislation prohibited
this practice.7' The court stated that issues of public policy
68. See id. at 211-12.
69. Id. at 211.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 211-12.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 212-13.
75. Id. at 213.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 214.
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involving health and welfare were the province of the legisla-
ture and not the courts.79 If surrogate motherhood were to be
declared illegal, the Kentucky legislature would have to do
SO.80
Two justices dissented.8' Both believed that the activities of
the defendant corporation violated the statute that prohibited
the payment of any compensation in connection with the
decision to terminate one's parental rights and to give up a
child for adoption. 2 Justice Wintersheimer, however, went
much further and criticized the entire concept of surrogate
motherhood. In his view, it was nothing more than a disguised
commercial transaction where the surrogate is paid in ex-
change for terminating her natural and biological rights in the
child.8 3 He envisioned the prospect of host-mothers with
wombs for hire and believed that the consequences that could
arise from exposing a woman's uterus to commercial medical
technology did not in any way contribute to the emancipation
of women. 4 He also was concerned about such mothers' eco-
nomic motivations:
Our consideration of public policy in this regard should
include the possible exploitation of financially-needy [sic]
women. Although there may be some altruistic women who
will volunteer as surrogate mothers, the greater prospect
is that monetary payment will have to be made to surro-
gates. The offer of financial payment will undoubtedly
persuade financially needy women to sell their reproduc-
tive faculties for the benefit of those who can pay. The
price at which a woman will sell her reproductive capacity
may depend on her financial status.
8 5
Shortly after the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in
Surrogate Parenting Associates, the New York Surrogate's
Court was confronted with the same issues in the context of
an adoption proceeding. In In re Baby Girl L.J,86 an infertile
couple filed a petition for the wife to adopt a child fathered by
79. Id. at 213-14.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 214.
82. Id. at 214-15.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 214-16.
85. Id. at 216.
86. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
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her husband and born to a surrogate, who was supposed to be
paid a fee of $10,000 pursuant to the contract entered into
between the parties.87 The court had little difficulty ruling on
the merits of the proposed adoption. Based upon the facts
before it, it held that the child's best interests would be served
if its biological father and his wife raised it as their own.88
The court had greater difficulty determining whether the
surrogate mother should be paid a fee. The court noted that
New York had a statutory prohibition against paying or
accepting compensation in connection with the placement of a
child for adoption. 89 Relying heavily upon the Kentucky Su-
preme Court's analysis in Surrogate Parenting Associates, the
New York court ruled in favor of the surrogate mother on the
same basis as that expressed by the Kentucky court, i.e., the
absence of any legislation specifically prohibiting this practice.
In so doing, it stated:
[Bliomedical science has advanced man into a new era of
genetics which was not contemplated by either the Ken-
tucky legislature nor by the New York legislature when it
enacted SSL 374(6) prohibiting payments in connection
with an adoption. Current legislation does not expressly
foreclose the use of surrogate mothers or the paying of
compensation to them under parenting agreements. Ac-
cordingly, the court finds that this is a matter for the
legislature to address rather than for the judiciary to
attempt to determine by the impermissible means of
"judicial" legislation. In its absence, this court will not
appropriate the function of the legislature and prohibit
such arrangements. 90
Four years later, in a similar adoption proceeding in New
York where the propriety of the surrogate's fee was at issue,
the New York Family Court reached the opposite conclusion
in In re Adoption of Paul91 and ruled that the statute prohibiting
payments in conjunction with placing a child up for adoption
was dispositive.92 It reasoned that any remuneration paid to
a mother in exchange for the surrender of her child for adoption
87. Id. at 814.
88. Id. at 815.
89. Id. (citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw §§ 374(6), 389 (McKinney 1994)).
90. 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
91. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990).
92. Id. at 817.
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violated New York's public policy against trafficking in
children. 3 Therefore, surrogate motherhood contracts were void,
not just voidable.94 The court agreed to permit the surrender
of the child to the adoptive parents and to terminate the surro-
gate's parental rights if she swore under oath that she had not
previously received any part of her contractual fee and would
not accept any such payment in the future.95 The court believed
that only in this manner would her decision be truly voluntary
and motivated by the child's best interests.96
Most, if not all, of the troubling issues raised by the practice
of surrogate motherhood were faced by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in In re Baby M.97 This famous case involved a
dispute between the surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, and the
sponsoring couple, the Sterns, over the custody of the child to
be born to Mrs. Whitehead. During her pregnancy, she
changed her mind about turning over the child and wanted to
retain custody. Discussions ensued and shortly after giving
birth Mrs. Whitehead requested that the Sterns allow her to
have possession of the infant for one week, after which she
would return it. The Sterns agreed, and Mrs. Whitehead ab-
sconded with the child to Florida. It ultimately took four
months for the Sterns to regain custody after the intervention
of the Florida courts and the local police force.9"
After Mrs. Whitehead initially refused to return the child to
the Sterns, they filed an action in New Jersey to terminate
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights pursuant to the surrogacy
contract that the parties had signed99 and requested that the
child be permanently placed in their custody, with Mrs. Stern
being permitted to adopt her.00 A lengthy trial was held sub-
sequent to the baby's recovery, where the trial court ruled in
favor of the Sterns in all respects, upholding the contract and
permitting Mrs. Stern to adopt the child.'0 '
93. Id.
94. Id. at 817-18.
95. Id. at 818-19.
96. Id.
97. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
98. Id. at 1235-37.
99. A copy of that contract is attached to the body of the opinion as Appendix A.
Id. at 1265-69.
100. Id. at 1237.
101. Id. at 1237-38.
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On direct appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed
and held that surrogacy contracts violated several state stat-
utes dealing with adoption and also violated the state's public
policy.102 It initially noted that New Jersey had on its books
laws prohibiting the payment of compensation in connection
with an adoption, requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment of the child before termination of parental rights
can occur or an adoption is granted, and making surrender of
custody and consent to the adoption revocable in private
placement adoptions. °3 The court had no difficulty finding
that the fee to be paid to Mrs. Whitehead was not for her
services, as stated in the contract, but was for purposes of
obtaining her baby.0 4 It noted that the fee was to be paid only
after surrender of custody of the newborn and termination of
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights.' 5 Moreover, the Sterns
would pay nothing if the child died prior to the fourth month
of pregnancy and only $1000 if it were stillborn; to the court,
this completely undercut the claim that the fee was for servic-
es only.' '6 To the court, it "strain[ed] credibility" to claim that
this surrogate parenthood contract was anything other than
private placement adoption for money, or, in other words, baby
selling.' '7
Thus, Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights could only be termi-
nated by strict compliance with the existing statutes governing
termination and not by contractual arrangement.' 8 New
Jersey law provided for such termination only if there were a
voluntary surrender of the child to an approved social welfare
agency or the Division of Youth and Family Services, accom-
panied by a formal document acknowledging the termination
of such rights, or if there were a showing of parental unfitness
or abandonment.0 9 The law, however, contains no provision
for a written surrender in a private placement adoption."0
102. Id. at 1240.
103. Id. (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54a, c (West 1993), which prohibits the
payment of compensation in connection with an adoption; § 9:3-48c, which addresses
termination of parental rights; § 9:2-14, 16, 17, which addresses revocability of
consent to an adoption through a private agency; and § 30:4C-23, which addresses
revocability of surrender of a child to the Bureau of Childrens Services).
104. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1241.
105. Id. at 1241.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1242.
109. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-16, -17, 9:3-41, 30:4c-23 (West 1993)).
110. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-14, 30:4c-23).
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Therefore, termination of parental rights in that context re-
quired a showing of "'intentional abandonment or a very
substantial neglect of parental duties .... " ,,".. A contractual
agreement regarding termination of parental rights was
unenforceable. 112
The surrogate contract violated other statutory provisions
governing the irrevocability of a mother's consent to have her
child adopted." 3 The court observed that the state legislature
"so carefully circumscribed all aspects of a consent to surren-
der custody-its form and substance, its manner of execution,
and the agency or agencies to which it may be made-in order
to provide the basis for irrevocability."" 4 The surrogacy con-
tract could not achieve a similar level of irrevocability because
it did not comply strictly with those statutes. 115 Therefore,
because the instant contract showed no such compliance, Mrs.
Whitehead was not bound by its terms."6
The court next examined the various public policy consider-
ations that militated against recognizing the validity of the
surrogate parenting contract."7 It noted that the contractual
provisions that governed custody were drafted prior to concep-
tion and birth, in violation of "settled law" that custody ques-
tions must be determined by the best interests of the child, a
determination that cannot be made prior to the child's birth."8
Moreover, the contract required permanent separation of the
infant from one of its biological parents, whereas the policy of
the state was to ensure as far as practicable that children are
brought up by both of their natural parents." 9 The arrange-
ment also violated the principle that biological parents have
equal status vis-A-vis their child. 2 °
The court saved its strongest condemnation, however, for the
role that money plays in the surrogacy transaction.'12 It saw
111. Id. (quoting § 9:3-48c(1)).
112. Id. at 1243.
113. Id. at 1244 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-14, 2-16 and 2-17).
114. Id. at 1245.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1245-46.
117. Id. at 1246-51.
118. Id. at 1246 (citing Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A.2d 593 (N.J. 1956)).
119. Id. at 1246-47.
120. Id. at 1247 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).
121. Id. at 1248-49.
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the issues as being little different than those involved in the
payment of money in connection with adoptions.'22 At its core,
surrogate motherhood involves the purchase of a woman's
procreative capacity at great risk to her.123 Whatever idealism
may motivate all or some of the participants, the court opined
that it is the profit motive that predominates and governs the
transaction, especially when a third party acts as intermedi-
ary.'24 The court noted that it was unlikely that the practice
of surrogate motherhood would survive without payment to
the surrogate. 25 The court stressed the danger that women
could be compelled to enter into surrogate motherhood solely
because of their economic circumstances-the potential for
their degradation apparent.
26
The court brushed aside any supposed distinction between
surrogate parenthood and ordinary adoptions arising from the
fact that in the former the pregnancy is intended and the sur-
rogate's decision to enter into the arrangement is totally
voluntary.127 It held that the essential evil in both situations
was the same: taking advantage of a woman's unwanted preg-
nancy or need for money in order to take away her child. 2 '
With the surrogate parenthood contract held invalid, the
dispute narrowed itself to a custody dispute between two
couples, each containing a biological parent. Because New
Jersey law provided that the claims of a natural mother and
natural father carry equal weight, the court's ruling had to
be based upon a determination of the child's best interests.
129
Thus, after considering the instability of the Whitehead
household due to financial problems, Mr. Whitehead's alco-
holism, and Mrs. Whitehead's "contempt" for the professional
counseling that the court thought Baby M might well re-
quire,"' the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's grant of permanent custody to the Sterns.' The court
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1248.
124. Id. at 1249.
125. Id. at 1248.
126. Id. at 1248-50.
127. Id. at 1248-49.
128. Id. at 1249.
129. Id. at 1256 (citing Parentage Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).
130. Id. at 1258-59.
131. Id. at 1259.
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also awarded visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead, the details
of which were to be determined by the lower court on re-
mand.
32
In Johnson v. Calvert,13 3 the California Supreme Court was
called upon to address the surrogacy issue, albeit in a slightly
different factual setting. Unlike the cases discussed above, this
case involved what has previously been termed gestational
surrogacy.'34 In Johnson, the surrogate mother contributed
none of the genetic material to the embryo, all of which came
from the intended parents via in vitro fertilization of the
husband's sperm and his wife's egg; the wife had undergone a
hysterectomy several years before, but her ovaries had not
been affected.'35 The surrogate's role was to act as an incubator
by gestating the embryo implanted into her, carrying the fetus
to term, and relinquishing custody of the resulting child.
36
During the course of the surrogate's pregnancy, she and the
intended parents had disputes surrounding the payment of
expenses to the surrogate and provision of life insurance for
her.137 The relationship eventually deteriorated to the point
that the surrogate threatened to keep the child. 138 This prompt-
ed the intended parents to file suit for a declaration that they
were the legal parents of the unborn child.1 39 In response, the
surrogate mother filed her own action to be declared the child's
legal mother. 40 The two cases were consolidated for hearing.1
4 '
The trial court and court of appeals both ruled in favor of the
sponsoring couple. 142 The California Supreme Court began its
analysis by examining the language of the Uniform Parentage
Act as adopted in California, which governs the establishment
of the legal relationships of parent and child.143 The court
determined that both the infertile wife and the surrogate
mother had presented acceptable proof of maternity under the
statute, the former by using the genetic results of blood tests
132. Id. at 1263-64.
133. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.








143. Id. at 778-79 (analyzing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1992), which has
been repealed and replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7650 (West 1994)).
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and the latter by actually giving birth to the child. 144 Because
the law indicated no clear preference for either type of evidence
to prove maternity, the court looked beyond the statutory
language and based its ruling upon the parties' intent as
expressed in their written surrogacy agreement. 4 ' That agree-
ment provided that the intended parents were to become the
legal parents of the child and that the surrogate had agreed to
give birth to facilitate that goal. 146 Therefore, the court ruled
that the genetic mother, not the gestational one, was the legal
mother under California law.
147
The opinion then addressed the surrogate's argument that
the surrogacy agreement violated public policy prohibiting
payment to procure consent to the adoption of a child and
prohibiting pre-birth waivers of parental rights. 4 The court
disagreed with that contention on the ground that gestational
surrogacy was fundamentally different from adoption and
therefore not subject to the adoption statutes. 149 Because the
parties voluntarily agreed to participate in IVF and related
medical procedures before the child was conceived, the surro-
gate was not vulnerable to financial inducements to part with
her own expected offspring. 5 ° The opinion further stated that
the payments to the surrogate compensated her for her servic-
es in gestating the fetus and not for relinquishing her parental
rights, noting that under the contract, these payments were
due both during the pregnancy and after the child's birth.15'
The court also was not persuaded that gestational surrogacy
would economically exploit poor women or foster the attitude
that children were commodities, citing the lack of evidence to
support either proposition (though the court implied that this
was a question the state legislature should examine). 152 Lastly,
144. Id. at 781-82.
145. Id. at 782.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 783-84.
149. Id. at 784.
150. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1996), which makes it a misdemeanor
to offer to pay money or anything of value to a parent for the placement for adoption,
for the consent to an adoption, or for cooperation in the completion of an adoption of
his or her child.
151. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
152. Id. at 784-85.
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it rejected the surrogate's constitutional claim based on the
right to privacy and procreative freedom.
15 3
Justice Kennard issued a vigorous dissent, claiming that it
was improper to determine the child's legal mother simply by
divining the parties' intent as expressed in their surrogate
parenting agreement.'54 She argued that the Uniform Parent-
age Act did not provide for such a result because that statute,
in creating guidelines for establishing the legal relationships
of parentage, did not contemplate the advances in technology
that would permit the separation of the genetic role in mother-
hood from the gestational role.'55 Justice Kennard discussed
the proposed Uniform Act.'56 She contended that it represent-
ed a better alternative because it imposed judicial monitoring
of surrogacy cases, which would definitively determine who is
the legal mother of the child in question. 5 7 This statute also
would eliminate many of the potential pitfalls of the surrogate
parenting arrangement as it requires that the intended moth-
er be infertile, that all parties meet the standards of fitness
for adoptive parents, that all parties receive mental health
counseling regarding the effect of the surrogacy arrangement,
and that legal counsel be appointed for the surrogate and a
guardian ad litem for the unborn child.'58
Justice Kennard wrote that use of an intent test was appro-
priate in resolving disputes over contractual or property rights
but had no application to determining questions of parent-
age. 5 9 Instead, she would apply the "best interests of the child"
standard to determine whether the genetic or gestational
mother could best assume the social and legal responsibilities
of motherhood. 6 ° She would have resolved the dilemma by
remanding to the trial court for a factual determination of this
issue."'
153. Id. at 785-87. The surrogate's constitutional claims are discussed infra Part
III.
154. Id. at 788 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 794-95.
156. Id. at 793-94, 798, 800-01 (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT § 2-8, 9b U.L.A. 161-76 (Supp. 1995)).
157. Id. at 800-01.
158. Id at 794 (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 6, 9b
U.L.A. 161-76 (Supp. 1995)).
159. Id. at 799.
160. Id. at 799-800.
161. Id. at 801. Cases subsequent to Johnson have reached contrary results on the
genetic v. gestational mother issue. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d
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This review of case law demonstrates the great difficulty the
courts have faced in resolving surrogate motherhood cases
under existing statutory frameworks. This difficulty is reflected
in judicial comments about the inadequacy of legislation in this
area. 162
Before reviewing the provisions of the Proposed Model
Surrogate Parenthood Act itself, this Article will first examine
the constitutional issues raised by legislative efforts to regulate
or even to ban the use of surrogate motherhood.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The use of the surrogate parenting arrangement, in addition
to facing the statutory obstacles identified in the above cases,
also raises several difficult constitutional questions. 6 3 For
example, if a state chooses to ban surrogacy outright, is there
a constitutional right to procreate using any means technologi-
cally available to the parties? 16 May a state determine that the
evils of surrogacy originate from the commercial nature of the
relationship and pass a law prohibiting payment to the surro-
gate? 61 Must the rights accorded to a married couple to use the
services of a surrogate also be provided to an unmarried couple
or to a single individual? 6 Does sexual orientation matter?
167
477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding the gestational mother is the legal mother); Belsito
v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994) (finding the genetic parents are the natural and
legal parents).
162. See text accompanying notes 154-158; In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505
N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (requesting that the legislature address
problems with the current statutory provisions).
163. For general commentary on the constitutional issues raised by the use of
commercial surrogacy, see Phyllis Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the
Problems and Suggestions for the Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71, 75-82 (1982); Noel
Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147, 161-66;
Robertson, supra note 27, at 957-67.
164. See infra Part III.B.
165. See infra Part III.C.
166. See infra Part III.D.
167. See infra Part III.E.
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A. Surrogacy and the Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court over the years has de-
lineated several areas of personal life in which an individual
is constitutionally entitled to be free from most forms of
government interference. These include decisions relating to
marriage, 68 procreation,169 contraception, 7 ° abortion,' 7 ' family
relationships,'72 and child rearing and education. 73 As stated
in Roe v. Wade, 74 when a decision as fundamental as whether
to bear or beget a child is involved, the imposition of a burden
on that decision by the state may be justified only by the exis-
tence of a compelling state interest, and the burden itself must
be drawn narrowly to express only that interest.
7 5
The Supreme Court has never addressed the specific issue
of whether a married couple or a single individual has an
unrestricted constitutional right to procreate via access to all
available reproductive technology. What the Court has done is
to establish clearly the right not to procreate, either through
access to contraception 171 or abortion, 17 as part of the overall
right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
7 8
It is not clear, however, that this right to privacy, established
in a negative context in which the goal was to prevent pro-
creation, applies with equal force to protect the right to go
outside the family structure and procreate using methods pro-
vided by advanced genetics. After all, the freedom to have
sexual relations without reproduction is not the same as the
freedom to have reproduction without sexual relations. 79
168. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
169. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
170. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
171. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
172. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
173. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
174. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
175. Id. at 155-56.
176. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,452-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
177. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
179. Robertson, supra note 53, at 406.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court squarely faced this issue in
In re Baby M. s° The Sterns asserted that the right to procreate
was a protected activity under the Constitution, which meant
that the surrogacy contract had to be enforced.'' The Court
agreed up to a point. It stated that the right to procreate
consists only of the right to have natural children, whether
through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination."' 2 Mr.
Stern had not been deprived of that right because through the
artificial insemination of Mary Beth Whitehead, Baby M was
his child.18 3 Mr. Stern's right of procreation did not, however,
give him the right to custody of the child as well.8 4 The court
ruled that a father has no constitutionally protected right to
custody of a child where it is opposed by the child's mother.8 5
The New Jersey court's narrow interpretation of the Sterns'
constitutionally protected right to make decisions regarding
childbirth does not comport with the sweeping statements
made by the United States Supreme Court regarding the broad
scope of the right to privacy. It is certainly plausible that the
privacy right would apply to the surrogacy arrangement. For
example, it seems unlikely that the Court would uphold a state
law banning the use of IVF or artificial insemination on the
grounds that the state only wanted to recognize childbearing
within the traditional family structure.
86
In this climate, the Court might find it difficult to distinguish
surrogacy and strip away the protection provided by the consti-
tutional right to privacy. Artificial insemination and other new
methods are just alternative avenues to procreation, avenues
that the advent of technology has made possible. Why should
some of them be constitutionally protected while others are
not? It is true that only surrogate motherhood involves the
planned pregnancy of a third party. But does this distinction
rise to the level of a difference of constitutional magnitude?
180. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
181. Id. at 1253.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1254.
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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B. Banning Surrogate Arrangements
Assuming for the moment that there is a fundamental con-
stitutional right to have a child using the services of a surro-
gate, it does not follow that the state is incapable of asserting
its legitimate interests in the childbearing process. It can
interfere with the procreative right only if its interests are of
a compelling nature, however. 1 7 One such potential interest
might be the protection of the surrogate from economic exploi-
tation. The state might conclude that poor women in particular
would be susceptible to using their reproductive capabilities to
benefit others because of the financial rewards involved. 188 The
state also might be legitimately concerned with the psychologi-
cal harm that could befall surrogate mothers when they are
forced to give up their babies. Preventing physical harm to the
surrogate is also very important; she must be physically able
to undergo the rigors of pregnancy and childbirth without
danger to herself.
189
No doubt these are substantial interests of the state and
perhaps they even rise to the level of "compelling." A state
would not have to ban surrogacy to further these goals because
more narrowly drawn alternatives are available. The state
could enact legislation requiring certification by a physician
that the surrogate would be physically able to withstand the
demands of pregnancy and childbirth. 90 A psychologist could
be required to certify that the surrogate fully understands her
obligation to give up the child at birth and has the emotional
strength to fulfill that obligation. 9' Also, a geneticist might be
required to determine the presence of any genetic defects the
surrogate could pass along.'92
To prevent exploitation of poor women, or any other type of
surrogate, a system could be put in place for court supervision
and approval of the surrogate parenting arrangement prior to
the initiation of non-coital reproduction. Through the testimony
187. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
188. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993).
189. See id. at 794 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
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of the surrogate and examination of other relevant evidence a
judge could verify that the surrogate entered into the trans-
action freely without coercion or duress, fully understands her
duties and obligations, and had the mental capacity to give her
voluntary informed consent to the entire arrangement.
193
Another potential state interest could be based upon grounds
of public morality, that the commercialization of producing
children is offensive to public mores.' 94 Clearly there are
certain types of transactions that we as a society will not
permit, no matter how agreeable the participants are. One ex-
ample that often surfaces in the debate over surrogacy is a
person who sells an organ to raise money. 9 ' This is a false
analogy: babies are quite different from non-regenerative body
parts. They are designed to leave the woman's body and are not
necessary for its normal functioning. Removal of the child
results in no permanent loss or damage to the surrogate.
196
If using the services of a surrogate mother for procreation is
protected under the constitutional right of privacy, the state's
moral distaste would not be a sufficient rationale for banning
the practice.' 9' In Carey v. Population Services International,98
for example, the Supreme Court held that the state's interest
in preventing teens from engaging in immoral sex acts was
insufficient to outweigh the fundamental right to decide
whether to have a child.' 99
Lastly, the state could assert the need to make sure the
surrogacy arrangement is in the best interests of the child to
be conceived. There is no question that the state has a compel-
ling interest under its parens patriae powers to protect the
rights of children. But is it necessary to ban surrogacy to
protect the child or are there less burdensome ways of achiev-
ing the same objective? The physical safety of the fetus can be
protected in the manner already suggested-by a physician's
certification that the surrogate is physically able to go through
193. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 742-43; Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785
(Cal. 1993) (Kennard J., dissenting) (citing UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT § 6(b), 9b U.L.A. 161-76 (Supp. 1995)). The proposed Model Act
[hereinafter MODEL ACT] requires all of these protections for the surrogate. See infra
§§ 2, 4-7 of the MODEL ACT.
194. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785.
195. Bradley, supra note 1, at 742-43.
196. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785.
197. Id. at 736.
198. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
199. Id. at 687, 694; Bradley, supra note 1, at 736.
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pregnancy and childbirth. The other main concern would be the
type of home the child would be entering. The issue here is the
same as with adoptions, and the solution can be the same as
well. A caseworker can visit the parents to determine whether
they will be able to provide the child with a wholesome, nur-
turing environment. 00 In the absence of such a determination,
the state might refuse to permit the surrogacy contract from
being fulfilled.
C. Prohibiting Payment to Surrogates
The above discussion demonstrates that even if the state can
assert compelling interests of its own in the surrogacy rela-
tionship, banning the practice altogether is not necessary to
further those interests. Less draconian alternatives exist, more
narrowly drawn, which would accomplish the same objectives.
Rather than attempt to outlaw the practice in its entirety, a
state might determine that the real evil is the commercial
nature of the transaction and simply prohibit payment to the
surrogate beyond her expenses, as in adoption cases.2 '
Indeed, this was the scenario that the Michigan Court of
Appeals faced in Doe v. Kelley.2 °2 A couple desired to engage
the services of a surrogate mother because the wife was unable
to bear children as the result of an earlier tubal ligation.0 3
They proposed to pay all of the surrogate's expenses plus a fee
of $5000.204 They were concerned with a Michigan law that
prohibited the exchange of money or other consideration in
connection with the adoption of a child, a law that would
become relevant when the wife attempted to adopt the child
born to the surrogate. Therefore, they filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking to have the statute declared unconsti-
tutional .205
The court of appeals agreed with the couple that the decision
to bear or beget a child is a fundamental interest protected by
200. See infra MODEL ACT § 7(d)(1)(C).
201. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
202. 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
203. Id. at 440.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 439.
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the right of privacy under the Constitution.0 6 It also noted,
however, that this right did not prohibit the state from inter-
fering in the parties' contractual relationship.2 7 The statute
in question did not prevent the use of a surrogate mother for
procreation; it only prevented the payment of consideration.
208
The court ultimately upheld the statute on the basis that the
parties were trying to use the Michigan adoption code to
change the legal status of the child born to the surrogate, a
goal that is not within the realm of fundamental interests that
were protected by the right to privacy.20 9
A statute that does not specifically ban the surrogate ar-
rangement but does prohibit payment of a fee to the surrogate
mother would have, as a practical matter, virtually the same
effect as outlawing the practice outright.210 Therefore, the
enactment of a prohibition against payment of a fee to the
surrogate carries with it the same constitutional difficulties as
a prohibition against surrogate motherhood generally.21' It is
overbroad and not necessary to achieve the legitimate state
interests involved.
Consider an analogous situation in the context of abortion
and the Supreme Court's "undue burden" analysis. 212 Suppose
a state banned payment to any doctor who performed an
abortion. The result presumably would be to limit severely the
pool of physicians Who would be willing to perform the proce-
dure and therefore place a heavy burden upon a woman's
constitutional right to obtain an abortion. Using the undue
burden standard,213 a law of this nature would almost unques-
tionably fail. Should not the result be the same when, because
of a ban on payment to surrogates, an infertile couple is effec-
tively prevented from having a child?
Until this point, this Part of the Article has focused exclu-
sively on the constitutional rights of the infertile parents. The
surrogate presumably is protected under the Constitution's
right of privacy as well.214 Would a ban of payment to the




210. See Keane, supra note 163, at 153; Tiller, supra note 10, at 433.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 176-86.
212. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992) (plurality opinion).
213. Id.
214. The surrogate mothers made this argument in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227,
1238 (N.J. 1988) and in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785-86 (Cal. 1993). The
argument was made in a different context: the surrogates were trying to keep the
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surrogate violate her constitutional rights in the areas of
procreation and childbearing? Probably not, because her
interests are quite different from the couple desiring to have
a child, or even from the individual who wants to use contra-
ceptives or have an abortion. Her motivation is primarily
commercial rather than personal: certainly not the type of
decision making about family relationships that the Supreme
Court has protected in the past. There is quite a difference
between a woman's right to have control over her reproductive
functions in the exercise of her personal autonomy and her
right to receive compensation to become pregnant as part of a
negotiated agreement to turn over the child to third parties.
It does not seem likely that the Supreme Court would extend
the reach of the right of privacy to encompass the decision of
a surrogate mother to use her reproductive capacity for pecu-
niary gain.
D. Limiting Surrogacy to Married Couples
The Uniform Act, by virtue of the definition of "intended
parents"215 limits the right to engage in surrogacy arrange-
ments to married couples. This brings up the question of
whether the Constitution protects the reproductive decision-
making of an unmarried couple or a single individual to the
same extent that it does for a married couple.216
babies and claimed a constitutional right to the companionship of their children based
on the right to privacy and procreative freedom. The Johnson court rejected this
argument. 851 P.2d at 785-87. The New Jersey Supreme Court avoided the issue.
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1253-55.
Others have claimed that banning surrogacy is a paternalistic denial of a woman's
right to make her own choices. For a summary of these arguments, see Lori B.
Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge to Feminists, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 72 (1988).
215. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 1(3), 9b U.LA 161-76
(Supp. 1995) (" 'intended parents' means a man and woman, married to each other").
216. A great deal has been written on this subject. See, e.g., Massie, supra note
8, at 527 ("A legislature... reasonably may distinguish between married couples and
unmarried, cohabiting couples when it establishes criteria for access to legalized
surrogacy."); Robertson, supra note 53, at 418 ("the legal protection of decisions to
conceive and bear a child has traditionally been confined to marriage."); Robertson,
supra note 27, at 964 ("While traditions of family and of reproduction within marriage
make it difficult for the Court to deny the procreative liberty of married persons, it
may be less willing to recognize the right of single persons to reproduce.") (footnotes
omitted); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried,
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As far as access to contraceptives is concerned, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that no discrimination against unmar-
ried people is permissible. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,217 the Court
struck down a Massachusetts law that allowed married but not
unmarried people to obtain contraceptive devices. The Court
reasoned that whatever the right of the individual to access
contraceptives, those rights must be the same for the married
and unmarried alike.218 In reaching its decision, the Court
strongly endorsed the application of the right of privacy to
unmarried people: "[ilf the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."219
As already stated, protecting the rights of unmarried people
to prevent pregnancy is not necessarily the same as according
constitutional protection to their desire to have children. In the
latter situation, the rights of those children are a legitimate
subject of the state's concern. The state might assert that it is
in the best interests of the child that it be raised in a tradition-
al family setting, which would provide greater stability and a
more supportive environment overall. And the Supreme Court
in the past has indicated its agreement with this view of the
family, noting that the institution is deeply rooted in the coun-
try's history and tradition.22 °
Countervailing considerations exist, however. For example,
no state prohibits single people from adopting children.22'
Therefore, one could assert that the states have made a value
judgment that a single parent can provide a proper home for
a child just as well as a married couple can. Of course, the
state could rationalize that, in an adoption situation, the child
98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 680 (1985) ("courts... should subject classifications drawing
distinctions [for purposes of availability of reproductive technology] between marital
and nonmarital families to heightened scrutiny"); Theresa M. Mady, Note, Surrogate
Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 346-47 (1981) ("the surrogate
mother arrangement should be limited to the situation where [a married couple adopts
the child] to ensure legitimacy of the child.").
217. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
218. Id. at 453.
219. Id. (emphasis in original).
220. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). Massie points out
that the traditional family structure has been protected under the Due Process Clause.
Massie, supra note 8, at 510-11.
221. Id. at 518 n.168.
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is already present and placing it with a single parent is prefer-
able to keeping it institutionalized.
The adoption analogy might be a persuasive argument until
one examines the laws pertaining to the use of IVF for repro-
duction. Many states provide for using IVF with anonymous
sperm donors, but none requires the female participant to be
married.22 Unlike adoption, IVF involves a child yet to be
conceived; there is no child in existence at the time the proce-
dure is begun. Therefore, if the primary concern is the child's
well-being, what justification exists for permitting single
women to partake in IVF while prohibiting a single male or
unmarried couple from using a surrogate mother? Whether or
not this violates the privacy rights of the would-be parents,
such disparate treatment would seem to call into question the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.223
Given single people's access to adoption and IVF, and in light
of the Supreme Court's strong pronouncements about their
privacy rights in the area of conception, there should be little
debate that the right to privacy encompasses the use of a
surrogate mother by unmarried people. If the states had a clear
policy in favor of the traditional family as the preferred choice
for the placement of children, preventing single people from
using surrogate mothers would be a logical extension of that
policy, but there is no such clear policy. Under these circum-
stances, it is difficult to see any compelling state interest in re-
stricting the use of surrogates to married couples.
E. Rights of Homosexuals
Finally, there is the question of the constitutional status of
homosexual men or women who desire to use the services of a
surrogate mother for procreative purposes. Can the state
legitimately restrict surrogacy to heterosexuals?
None of the Supreme Court rulings referenced earlier were
made in the context of homosexual rights.224 It is difficult to
imagine the Court supporting the desire of homosexuals to
have children, especially after its ruling in Bowers v.
222. Id. at 521; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 25, at 242.
223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.. . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.")
224. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
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Hardwick,22 where it upheld the criminal conviction of a
homosexual man for violation of Georgia's anti-sodomy stat-
ute.22 The Court was not the least bit receptive to the argu-
ment that there should be constitutional protection for private,
consensual sex acts between adults.227
Gays and lesbians have made a great deal of progress over
the last few years in the adoption arena, however. There have
been approximately 100 court-approved lesbian adoptions
during that time, principally in California and other western
states. 228 Courts in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey,
among others, have also approved adoptions by the lesbian
partner of the biological mother of a child, who had been im-
pregnated by artificial insemination. 229 But the states' in-
creased receptivity toward gay and lesbian adoption does not
bear upon the constitutional right to privacy as it affects
procreation °.2 " Given the Supreme Court's hostility toward
homosexual activity23' as evidenced by the Bowers decision, it
is difficult to imagine that the Court would rule that the right
to privacy extends to the use of a surrogate mother by gays and
lesbians who want to become parents.
IV. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED
MODEL SURROGATE PARENTHOOD ACT
One might argue that, constitutional considerations aside,
the simplest solution to the surrogate parenting controversy
would be for the legislatures of the various states simply to
outlaw the practice in its entirety, or at least the commercial
225. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
226. Id. at 196.
227. Id. at 190, 191.
228. Joseph F. Sullivan, Court Approves Lesbian's Right to Adopt Partner's Child,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1993, § 6, at 6.
229. Andrew Fegelman, State Court Says Gays Have Right to Adopt, CHI. TRIB.,
July 19, 1995, § 1, at 1.
230. For an analysis of the rights of homosexual parents in child custody disputes,
see Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1989).
231. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding invalid, on equal
protection grounds, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all
legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination).
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aspects of it; and in fact, states have taken both approaches.
232
Such a solution, however, is an inappropriate response to the
problem. Because the necessary reproductive technology is
currently available and because many people desperately
want to have children but are unable to have them by any
other means,13 it appears unlikely that surrogate motherhood
is going to be eradicated. One would certainly expect the
practice to continue among family members and close friends,
at the very least.234 Moreover, it is, at its essence, a beneficent
arrangement that could potentially bring the joys of parent-
hood to thousands of people who desperately want a family
but are unable to conceive a child or obtain one in any other
manner. Prohibiting a practice that is designed to promote
and strengthen family life seems counterproductive.
Rather than undertaking the drastic legislative action of
prohibition, the public's interest would be better served by
permitting surrogacy arrangements but with careful regula-
tion to insure that the surrogate is not subject to exploitation
of any kind, that her decision to give up her parental rights is
truly informed and voluntary, and that the interests of all
parties to the arrangement, including those of the unborn
child, are zealously safeguarded.
The proposed Model Act is designed to accomplish all of
these goals. It is intended to cover comprehensively every
situation in which a woman bears a child for another, regard-
less of the genetic relationships between the parties and the
fetus, the marital status or sexual preference of the proposed
parents, or the manner in which the surrogate is impregnated.
The Act attempts to address all issues pertinent to surrogacy,
including not only those that have heretofore been so difficult
for the courts to resolve but also many others that have not
yet found their way into case law.
235
232. Ten states have outlawed surrogacy completely: Alabama, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Utah, and West
Virginia. The following states have prohibited commercial surrogacy only: Florida,
Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Virginia and Washington. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
234. See, e.g., KEANE AND BREO, supra note 2, at 57-74; RAGONt, supra note 2, at
60.
235. Examples of the latter include: situations where one or both of the proposed
parents dies prior to the child's birth (MODEL ACT § 12), the right of the surrogate to
obtain an abortion (MODEL ACT § 4(h)), the fee payable to the surrogate in the event
of a miscarriage or stillbirth (MODEL ACT § 4(i)), and the child's right to learn the
identity of the surrogate (MODEL ACT § 7(e)).
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The underlying policy of the Act is that, within certain care-
fully defined parameters, surrogacy should be available under
strict court supervision and monitoring to anyone who cannot
have a child by natural means and has been unsuccessful in
obtaining one through non-coital reproduction (e.g., in vitro
fertilization, embryo transfer, etc.) or via adoption. In other
words, surrogate parenthood is viewed strictly as a remedy of
last resort to be used after all other means for obtaining a
child have proved inadequate. The law is not intended in any
way to encourage the use of surrogate mothers but accepts
their existence as the result technological advances in the field
of reproductive genetics.
Structurally, the Act bears some similarity to the Uniform
Act. Like the Uniform Act, this proposed Model Act requires
court approval of the surrogate parenting agreement before it
is implemented and mandates that all parties receive psycho-
logical counseling, a physical examination, and genetic screen-
ing, and that the relevant child welfare agency conduct a home
study, before judicial approval will be given. As the forthcoming
analysis will reveal, however, there are substantial differences
between the two proposed laws, particularly in the termination
of the surrogate's parental rights.236 The proposed Model Act
attempts to combine the benefits of surrogate parenting ar-
rangements with some of the safeguards found in adoption
procedures by permitting the surrogate to change her mind and
keep the child born to her. Thus, the statute would prevent the
type of conflict between the proposed parents and the surrogate
that arose in both the Baby M case and in Johnson v. Calvert.
This feature of the statute will be examined in much greater
detail in the next section, which contains commentary on each
provision of the law.
236. Compare UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 7, 9b UL.A.
161-76 (Supp. 1995) (preventing surrogate from deciding to terminate the contract
and keep the child after 180 days after the last insemination) with MODEL ACT § 8
(providing for a continuation of the surrogate's parental rights until 72 hours after
birth).
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Proposed Surrogate Parenthood Act
SECTION ONE. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the Proposed Model Surrogate
Parenthood Act.
SECTION Two. DEFINITIONS
As used in this Act:
"Artificial insemination" means impregnating a woman by
the introduction of sperm into her vagina, cervical canal, or
uterus by means other than sexual intercourse.
"Donor" means any individual, excluding the proposed father
or mother, who contributes sperm or eggs used to impregnate
a surrogate through non-coital reproduction.
"Embryo" means the organism resulting from the union of
sperm and egg.
"Embryo transfer" means the implantation of a viable embryo
into a woman's uterus.
"Infertile" means:
(a) the inability of a man or a woman to conceive a
child after one year of unprotected sexual inter-
course;
(b) the inability of a woman to carry a pregnancy to
term;
(c) the inability of a woman to undergo pregnancy or
childbirth without serious medical risk to herself
or the fetus; or
(d) one or more of the proposed parent(s) being at risk
for transmitting a genetic disease or defect to any
child they conceive.
"Informed consent" means a knowing and voluntary decision
made by a person with legal capacity to consent, which is based
upon a reasoned evaluation of all relevant factors, including
the availability of alternatives to achieve the same objective.
"In vitro fertilization" means all medical procedures used
to impregnate a woman by the fertilization of an egg with
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sperm outside the body and the implantation of the embryo
into the woman for gestation.
"Non-coital reproduction" means any method used to impreg-
nate a woman other than sexual intercourse.
"Parenting fee" means a fee paid by the proposed parent(s)
to the surrogate to compensate her for her services under the
surrogate parenting agreement, separate and apart from
reimbursement for her expenses.
"Proposed father" means a male, at least 25 years of age, who
is either unmarried or married to the proposed mother, and
who will be the legal father of a child conceived pursuant to a
surrogate parenting agreement.
"Proposed mother" means a female, at least 25 years of age,
who is either unmarried or married to the proposed father, and
who will be the legal mother of the child conceived pursuant
to a surrogate parenting agreement.
"Proposed parent(s)" means no more than two individuals,
comprised of the proposed father or the proposed mother or any
combination thereof.
"Related surrogacy" means a surrogate parenting agreement
where the surrogate is the mother, mother-in-law, grand-
mother, aunt, great aunt, daughter, daughter-in-law, grand-
daughter, niece, sister, sister-in-law, or cousin of the first
degree of one or more of the proposed parent(s), whether by
blood or marriage.
"Surrogate" means a female who agrees, pursuant to a
surrogate parenting agreement, to bear a child for the proposed
parent(s) and who, at the time of execution of the agreement:
(a) is at least 25 and not more than 35 years of age;
(b) has experienced at least one live vaginal birth
without complication within the previous 5 years;
(c) has never had a miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy,
medically necessary abortion, given birth to a
stillborn or premature baby, or experienced any
other pregnancy related condition that was dan-
gerous to her health or that of the fetus; and
(d) is otherwise mentally and physically capable of
carrying out her duties and obligations under the
surrogate parenting agreement.
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"Surrogate parenting agreement" means a written agreement
between the proposed parent(s), the surrogate and her spouse,
if any, whereby the surrogate agrees to:
(a) become pregnant by non-coital reproduction using
the sperm of the proposed father or donor and her
own egg, that of the proposed mother, or donor;
(b) to carry the resulting fetus to term; and
(c) to turn over to the proposed parent(s) the custody
of any child born to her, relinquishing all of her
parental rights under law, unless she chooses to
keep the child within seventy two (72) hours after
birth.
"Surrogate's expenses" means all costs and expenses incurred
by the surrogate arising out of or related in any way to her




(c) all medical expenses of whatever nature, including
expenses for physical examinations, genetic testing,
psychological testing and evaluation, procedures for
non-coital reproduction, prenatal care, difficult
pregnancy, miscarriage, medically necessary abor-
tion, childbirth, and post-partum complications up
to six months after birth;
(d) lost wages and benefits;
(e) child care expenses; and
(W travel and lodging costs.
"Unlawful surrogacy arrangement" means any oral or written
agreement where a female agrees to bear a child for another
and to relinquish her parental rights to that child without first
obtaining approval by the court as provided in this Act.
COMMENTS TO SECTION Two
The definitions contained in Section Two of the proposed
Model Act provide the framework for the substantive provisions
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to follow and give the reader a preview of the philosophical
bases of the statute. For example, the definition of "infertile"
goes beyond the notion of the inability to conceive a child
through sexual intercourse. Infertility under this statute also
includes cases where a woman can conceive a child but cannot
complete the pregnancy, e.g., she might suffer from miscar-
riages or perhaps is diabetic and pregnancy is too dangerous
for her. The possibility of transmitting a genetic disease or
defect to one's offspring is also included in the category of
"infertile." In other words, any known impediment to a wom-
an's or a couple's ability to produce a healthy child without
substantial risk to the health of any of the parties renders
them "infertile" for purposes of the statute. The significance of
this designation will be seen in Section 6(b)(6)(D) of the Act,
which requires that one or more of the proposed parent(s) be
infertile in order to obtain court approval of the surrogate
parenting agreement.
"Parenting fee" is clearly identified as a fee paid to the
surrogate for her services, completely separate from reim-
bursement for her expenses. The statute not only contemplates
payment of such a fee but makes it a mandatory feature of the
surrogate parenting agreement in Section 4(b) and even sets
a minimum amount for surrogate compensation.237 The pro-
posed Model Act thus rejects the reasoning of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the Baby M case,238 Justice Wintersheimer's
dissent in the Kentucky Surrogate Parenting Associates case,239
and several commentators 240 that the payment of a fee to the
surrogate will exploit women's financial needs, commercialize
their reproductive capacities, turn children into commodities,
and amount to nothing more than baby selling.
The Act has intentionally been structured to avoid these
results. Numerous protections are inserted into various parts
of the statute to ensure that the surrogate is not exploited in
237. Some proposals, rather than setting a floor on surrogate compensation,
establish a ceiling instead. See, e.g., FIELD, supra note 2, at 62; Mandler, supra note
2, at 1307.
238. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Report of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association,
in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD app. IV at 304 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); George Annas,
Death Without Dignity for Commercial Surrogacy: The Case of Baby M, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. April/May 1988 at 21, 23; Charles Dougherty, The Ethical Case Against
Surrogacy, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1585, 1586-87 (1992); Krimmel, supra note 27, at
35.
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any way. These protections include a requirement that she
have separate counsel to represent her in the drafting of the
surrogate parenting agreement and in the judicial proceedings
to approve the agreement, 24' a requirement that a physician
and mental health professional certify that she has the proper
physical and mental health to undergo pregnancy and child-
birth and the emotional stability to give up the child,242 judi-
cial supervision of the entire procedure,248 and the surrogate's
limited option to decide to keep the child after giving birth.244
In addition, by requiring that the surrogate be paid part or all
of her fee in the event of a medically necessary abortion,
miscarriage, or stillbirth,245 the Act makes clear that the
proposed parent(s) are paying for the surrogate's inconve-
nience, health risk, and rigors of pregnancy and childbirth,
and not for the purchase of a baby. The fact that the surrogate
has the option to keep the child is perhaps the strongest
evidence of the true purpose of her remuneration.
Even assuming that the surrogate mother is paid only for
her "services," the Act still leaves open the issue of whether
permitting parties to contract for the use of reproductive
services is appropriate. Does this not commercialize a woman's
reproductive capacity, even if it does not exploit her finan-
cially? That result would seem inherent in a transaction where
payment is made to the surrogate to have a child for someone
else. Even if it can be justified on the basis of a woman's
control over the use of her body, as some have asserted,246
there is no denying the significance of the financial element
involved.
Because of this financial element, some people might find
the practice of commercial surrogacy offensive, even if it were
regulated and all parties guarded against exploitation. Ideally,
there would be enough children for all childless couples to
adopt. We have seen, however, that this is not the case.247
Moreover, the technological advances in reproductive genetics
that make all of this possible are not going to be reversed, and
technology will not stop advancing. Researchers continue to
241. MODEL ACT §§ 3(d), 6(a).
242. Id. § 6(b)(6).
243. Id. §§ 6, 7.
244. Id. § 9.
245. Id. §§ 4(h), (i).
246. See Andrews, supra note 214, at 73.
247. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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discover new reproductive techniques that will be attractive to
childless couples. Recall the previous example of the newly
discovered ability to extract immature eggs from a woman's
ovaries and cause them to mature in a petri dish, thus making
them available for fertilization by IVF.248 In that example,
since the wife had to have a hysterectomy because of cancer,
the couple will need a surrogate mother to gestate the now
frozen embryos.249 Other recent examples of how the technolo-
gy permits those who are otherwise incapable to have children
involve a fifty-nine-year-old British woman and a sixty-two-
year-old Italian woman who underwent IVF using egg donors,
became pregnant, and gave birth.25 °
In short, if the medical technology exists to produce children
where it would not otherwise be possible, people who need it
will take advantage of that technology. Passing laws declaring
that surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable is not
going to stop the practice; it will just drive it underground,
resulting in more cases like Baby M. Even if surrogacy is
criminalized, as in Michigan where it is a felony punishable by
a fine of up to $50,000 and/or up to five years in prison to
enter into a surrogate parenting agreement,25' it seems doubt-
ful that the practice will be curtailed. It is difficult to imagine
that law enforcement officials will make this a top priority, or
that prosecutors will be especially eager to bring these cases
to court. How severely will a judge treat a defendant whose
crime consists of trying to have a baby?
It is more plausible that criminalization will cause people to
go to other states where the atmosphere is not so hostile. This
may help the state of Michigan, but it does nothing to reduce
the frequency of surrogate motherhood on a national level. The
Act anticipates this conflict of laws problem and addresses it
in Section 19.252
The definitions of proposed mother, father, and parent(s)
under the statute should make it clear that the Act does not
restrict the right to use a surrogate to married couples. Any
248. See supra text accompanying note 50.
249. See Callahan, supra note 50, at 6.
250. William E. Schmidt, Birth to 59-Year-Old Briton Raises Ethical Storm, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1993, at 1; Doctor Defends Assisting Woman, 62, to Have Baby, CHI.
TRIB., July 21, 1994, Evening Health, at 7.
251. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.857(b) (West 1993).
252. For a thorough analysis of the issue, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy
Arrangements and Conflicts of Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 399.
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person or couple, married or unmarried, heterosexual or
homosexual, who otherwise meets the statutory requirements
is eligible. As previously discussed," 3 the recognized constitu-
tional rights of the unmarried and of homosexuals to procreate
using the latest in reproductive technology has not been
established by the Supreme Court. The rights that are granted
to these parties under the proposed Model Act are not based
upon any recognized constitutional considerations but rather
are premised upon notions of equity and fundamental fairness.
The term "related surrogacy" refers to what might be called
a family surrogate arrangement, where a female relative of
the childless couple254 volunteers to have a baby for them.
Many of the concerns about commercial surrogacy relation-
ships do not apply to this situation and the statute exempts a
related surrogacy from many of its requirements.255
A "surrogate" is defined in Section 2 as a woman who agrees
to bear a child for others pursuant to a surrogate parenting
agreement and who is between twenty-five and thirty-five
years of age. The surrogate must have experienced at least one
live vaginal birth without complication in the previous five
years and must not have ever had a miscarriage, ectopic
pregnancy, medically necessary abortion, given birth to a
stillborn or premature child, or experienced any other preg-
nancy related condition that was dangerous to her health or
that of the fetus. The intent of these provisions should be
clear: the surrogate should be someone old enough to possess
sufficient maturity to be able to make a meaningful decision
about becoming a surrogate mother, she must have demon-
strated the ability to experience pregnancy and childbirth
without undue difficulty, and she should be in her prime child-
bearing years.
The "surrogate parenting agreement" sets forth the terms of
the surrogacy relationship between the parties. Those terms
253. See supra text accompanying notes 216-31.
254. For ease of reference, the terms "couple," "intended parents," and "proposed
parents" will be used interchangeably to refer to those who desire to use the services
of a surrogate mother. These terms are for convenience only and carry no implication
whatsoever that only married heterosexual couples are eligible to participate in a
surrogate parenting arrangement.
255. For example, in related surrogacies there is no requirement that the
surrogate be represented by counsel in the negotiation of the parenting agreement
(MODEL ACT § 3(d)) or at the judicial hearing (MODEL ACT § 6(a)), that she be paid her
expenses or a parenting fee (MODEL ACT § 4(b)), or that the proposed parents purchase
term life insurance for themselves and for her (MODEL ACT § 4(k)).
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are severely circumscribed by the statute in Section 4, how-
ever, and there is very little left for the parties to negotiate. A
detailed discussion of those terms will be postponed until the
provisions of Section 4 are analyzed.
An "unlawful surrogacy arrangement" is one that does not
follow the dictates of the statute. The penalty for carrying out
such an agreement is not criminal, but it frustrates the essen-
tial purpose of the arrangement. As provided in Section 15,
the situation is treated as one where the woman has given
birth to a child fathered by a man who is not her husband.
The surrogate is considered the legal mother of the child, the
proposed father is the legal father, and the court is required
to determine questions of support and visitation under exist-
ing state parentage laws.
SECTION 3. EXECUTION OF THE SURROGATE
PARENTING AGREEMENT
(a) The surrogate parenting agreement shall be executed
by the surrogate, her husband, if any, and by the proposed
parent(s).
(b) In the event the surrogate or a proposed parent is
legally separated from his or her respective spouse or in-
volved in proceedings for dissolution of marriage under
[this state's dissolution of marriage laws], then that per-
son's spouse need not be a party to the surrogate parenting
agreement.
(c) Every individual executing the surrogate parenting
agreement shall have his or her signature notarized by a
notary public licensed in this state.
(d) Except in cases of related surrogacy, the surrogate
shall be represented by counsel in the negotiation and
drafting of the surrogate parenting agreement, as well as
in all judicial proceedings under this Act. The proposed
parent(s) shall be represented by separate counsel, if any.
(e) Notwithstanding the fact that pursuant to Section
4(b) the proposed parent(s) shall be required to pay all of
the surrogate's legal fees (as part of the surrogate's ex-
penses defined in Section 2), counsel for the surrogate
mother shall represent the interests of the surrogate
mother only, to the exclusion of any other party. Providing
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legal representation to the surrogate mother pursuant to
the provisions of this statute shall not be considered a
violation of [this state's canons of legal ethics] in any re-
spect. No disciplinary action of any nature shall be initiat-
ed nor prosecuted against an attorney solely by reason of
his or her performance of such legal services.
(f) The provisions of Section 3(e) shall not apply to an
attorney who performs any legal services relating to an
unlawful surrogacy arrangement as defined in Section 2.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 3
This section addresses the technical requirements of execut-
ing the surrogate parenting agreement and also provides
assurance that any attorney representing the surrogate moth-
er will not have a conflict of interest because his or her fee is
paid for by the proposed parent or parents. The surrogate's
husband, if any, is made a party to the contract to show his
consent to his wife's becoming pregnant by someone other than
himself and to her giving up custody of the child she bears.
Note that the proposed mother is required to be a signatory to
the contract, which is not typically the case. 256 The rationale
for including her in the contractual relationship among the
parties is that because the proposed Model Act does not con-
template a separate adoption proceeding where the proposed
mother becomes legal mother of the child, there is no reason
to exclude her from active participation as a party to the
agreement.
All parties are to be represented by separate counsel, unless
the proposed parent(s) choose not to have an attorney. The
cost of the surrogate's attorney is to be paid for by the par-
ent(s). Recognizing the distinct nature of a related surrogacy,
this section dispenses with the requirement of counsel for the
surrogate in situations of that nature.
Section 3(e) is intended to clarify any confusion regarding
the role of the attorney for the surrogate mother that might
arise because the proposed parent(s) are responsible for pay-
ment of his fees. The entire statutory scheme would be tainted
unless the surrogate's attorney owed a duty of undivided fealty
256. See supra note 2.
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to her. Moreover, it would be very difficult for the surrogate to
obtain representation if her attorney faced potential liability
for violation of the state's code of professional ethics. 257 There-
fore, the Act insulates the surrogate's counsel against such
claims. This protective shield only applies, however, if the
surrogate parenting arrangement is one sanctioned by this
statute. Under Section 3(f), if the parties enter into an unlaw-
ful surrogate arrangement, any attorney who is involved in a
professional capacity would be subject to the full panoply of
the law's sanctions for ethical violations.
SECTION 4. MANDATORY TERMS OF SURROGATE
PARENTING AGREEMENT
No surrogate parenting agreement shall be approved by the
court pursuant to this Act unless it provides as follows:
(a) That the surrogate agrees to undergo non-coital
reproduction using the sperm of the proposed father or of
a donor in order to become pregnant, carry the fetus to
term, give birth, and turn over custody of the child to the
proposed parent(s) within seventy-two (72) hours after the
birth, irrevocably giving up all of her parental rights under
law, unless she chooses to keep the child as provided in
Section 9 hereunder;
(b) That except in cases of related surrogacy, that the
proposed parent(s) shall pay all of the surrogate's expenses
as they become due and shall also pay a parenting fee to
the surrogate of not less than $10,000.00. The manner and
method of payment of the parenting fee shall be deter-
mined by the parties to the agreement; provided, however,
that at least one-half of the parenting fee must be paid to
the surrogate by the onset of the seventh month of preg-
nancy. In the event that the surrogate and/or her husband
have health insurance that would pay for all or any part of
her medical expenses, the parties may agree to what
extent her expenses shall be paid by her insurance or by
257. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW app., Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5,
EC 5-22 (McKinney 1996); CAL. CIV. AND CRIM. R., Rules of Professional Conduct of
the State Bar of California, R. 3-310(F) (West 1995).
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the proposed parent(s). The surrogate parenting agreement
shall state that the parenting fee does not constitute pay-
ment to produce a child or for the relinquishment of the
surrogate's parental rights but is to be paid solely for her
rendering the services described thereunder;
(c)(1) That the surrogate shall undergo a complete physi-
cal examination by a licensed physician of her choice to
determine the state of her general physical health, wheth-
er she has any sexually transmitted diseases or is infected
with the HIV virus, the existence of any physical condition
that would interfere with her ability to become pregnant,
and whether going through pregnancy and childbirth
would pose any unreasonable risk to her health or that of
the fetus;
(2) That the proposed parent(s) shall undergo a com-
plete physical examination by a licensed physician to
determine the state of their general physical health and
whether they have any sexually transmitted diseases or
are infected with the HIV virus;
(3) That the proposed parent(s) shall undergo psycho-
logical evaluation and counseling from a psychiatrist or
psychologist licensed in this state regarding the conse-
quences and responsibilities of surrogate parenthood, and
to determine their ability to raise a child born pursuant to
a surrogate parenting agreement, whether they are capa-
ble of giving their informed consent to the agreement, and
whether they suffer from any mental illness, defect, or
disorder that would impair their ability to raise a child;
(4) That the surrogate and her husband, if any, shall
undergo psychological evaluation and counseling from a
psychiatrist or psychologist licensed in this state regarding
the potential psychological consequences of the surrogate's
performance of her responsibilities under the surrogate
parenting agreement, whether she and her husband are
capable of giving their informed consent to the agreement,
whether she suffers from any mental illness, defect, or
disorder and whether she is mentally and emotionally
capable of carrying a child and giving it up at birth;
(5) That any party to the surrogate parenting agree-
ment whose sperm or egg will be used to impregnate the
surrogate, and the donor, if known, shall undergo genetic
screening and testing to determine whether any of them is
capable of transmitting a genetically based disease or
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defect to the child to be conceived, including testing the
sperm or egg itself for the presence of any abnormalities or
genetic defects;
(6) That the parties to the surrogate parenting agree-
ment shall obtain written reports from all health care
professionals listed in sub-sections (1) to (5) describing the
results of all such examinations, tests, evaluations, and
counseling which shall be made available to all other
parties and attached as exhibits to the agreement. By their
execution of the surrogate parenting agreement, all parties
thereto irrevocably waive any and all privileges against
disclosure of such information as may otherwise be provid-
ed by law;
(d)(1) That except in cases of related surrogacy, each
party to a surrogate parenting agreement, except the
surrogate's husband, if any, shall execute a written state-
ment describing all non-routine medical illnesses and
injuries that they have experienced in the previous ten
years or since the age of maturity, whichever is longer,
whether they are currently or have ever in the same time
period been engaged in the habitual use of drugs or alcohol
and any current or prior treatment therefor, whether they
have ever been exposed to radiation or any toxic substanc-
es and all details thereof, and whether they have ever been
convicted of a crime, excluding minor traffic offenses. The
surrogate shall additionally provide all relevant details
concerning the outcome of all pregnancies she has experi-
enced. Each party's statement shall be made under oath,
shall be notarized, and shall contain written authorization
for the release of any and all medical and legal records
pertaining thereto. All such statements shall be attached
as exhibits to the surrogate parenting agreement;
(2) That the proposed parent(s) and the surrogate have
authorized the release of such information to each other,
which has been reviewed by the parties prior to execution
of the agreement, or that one or more of the parties has
waived the right to review such information;
(e)(1) That the surrogate agrees to surrender custody of
the child or to accept the legal obligations of parenthood if
she elects to keep the child as provided in Section 9;
(2) That the surrogate's husband, if any, agrees to sur-
render custody of the child or to accept the legal obligations
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of parenthood if the surrogate elects to keep the child as
stated above;
(f) That the surrogate agrees to submit to reasonable
medical evaluation and treatment during the course of the
pregnancy and to adhere to reasonable medical instructions
about her prenatal health and otherwise not to behave in
a manner so as to endanger the fetus. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the surrogate shall not be required to, but may
voluntarily, undergo any procedure intended to determine
the sex of the fetus or whether the fetus exhibits any
mental or physical impairment. The surrogate parenting
agreement may provide for the payment of an amount in
addition to the parenting fee to the surrogate if during the
pregnancy she adheres to all reasonable medical instruc-
tions regarding prenatal care, refrains from smoking,
ingesting alcoholic beverages, or abstains from any other
specified behavior, or undergoes any of the procedures
listed in the preceding sentence;
(g) That the proposed parent(s) agree to take custody of
the child born to the surrogate and immediately accept all
parental rights and responsibilities for the child which are
imposed by law regardless of the existence or degree of any
physical or mental impairment the child may exhibit;
(h) That the surrogate and her physician of choice have
the sole decision-making authority with regard to the man-
agement of the pregnancy, including the decision to termi-
nate that pregnancy as the surrogate may determine;
provided, however, that:
(1) Except in the case of related surrogacy, if the
pregnancy is terminated for medical reasons upon the
recommendation of the surrogate's physician, the surrogate
shall receive one-half of the parenting fee plus all of her
expenses incurred to date, including those generated in ter-
minating the pregnancy; and
(2) If the pregnancy is not terminated for any medical
reasons but at the election of the surrogate, the surrogate
parenting agreement may provide that the proposed par-
ent(s) are not liable for any of the surrogate's expenses
incurred pursuant to the agreement nor for the payment
of the parenting fee.
(i)(1) Except in the case of related surrogacy, that in the
event the surrogate suffers a miscarriage during the course
of the pregnancy, the proposed parent(s) shall pay all of the
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surrogate's expenses, including those incident thereto and
shall also be liable for payment of one half of the parenting
fee;
(2) That should the child be stillborn or die during or
immediately after birth, the surrogate shall be entitled to
receive the entire parenting fee in addition to all of her
expenses;
(j) That upon the termination of the surrogate's pregnan-
cy for any reason or the occurrence of a miscarriage or a
stillbirth, the surrogate parenting agreement shall be
considered null and void and of no further legal effect;
(k) That except in cases of related surrogacy, the pro-
posed parent(s), in addition to the surrogate's expenses and
parenting fee, shall bear the cost of providing the following
insurance coverage:
(1) Term life insurance on the life of each of the pro-
posed parent(s), as applicable, totaling Dollars ($ ),
payable in trust to the unborn child, and
(2) Term life insurance on the life of the surrogate in
the minimum amount of Dollars ($ ), payable to a
beneficiary named by the surrogate.
Such insurance shall remain in effect for the term of the
pregnancy and for a period of six months after the birth of
the child;
(1) That the surrogate and her husband, if any, assume
all risks associated with conception, pregnancy, childbirth,
and postpartum complications and waive and release all
claims they might have against the proposed parent(s) for
any damage to the surrogate's health or her death which
occurs as a result of participating in the surrogate
parenting agreement; and
(m) That it is governed by this Act, the provisions of
which are incorporated therein, and that any term of the
agreement in conflict with the provisions of this Act is null
and void.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 4
Section 4 is probably the most important part of the statute,
because it is here that the proposed Model Act spells out in
great detail the required terms and provisions that must
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appear in any surrogate parenting agreement. Section 4(a)
contains the basic agreement of the surrogate to become
impregnated, carry the fetus to term, give birth, and turn over
the child to the proposed parents, irrevocably giving up her
parental rights in the process unless she chooses to retain
possession of the child under the procedure spelled out in
Section 9.
The timing of the termination of the surrogate's parental
rights has proved to be a difficult issue in other contexts. For
example, the fact that the surrogate parenting agreement in
In re Baby M25 called for the termination of the surrogate's
parental rights prior to the birth of the child, which is typical
in surrogacy contracts,5 9 proved quite problematic for the New
Jersey Supreme Court.26 ° The proposed Model Act makes
termination of the surrogate's rights co-extensive with turning
over custody of the child to the proposed parent(s); obviously,
if she keeps the baby, there is no termination of the surrogate's
rights as a parent.
Section 4(b) imposes a mandatory requirement that the
proposed parent(s) pay all of the surrogate's expenses incident
to the surrogacy arrangement as well as a separate parenting
fee of not less than $10,000. The parties may choose whether
her expenses are to be paid by the surrogate's health insurance
or in some other manner and are free to determine how the
parenting fee is to be paid, with the proviso that the surrogate
must receive at least one-half of the parenting fee by the onset
of the seventh month of pregnancy.
The Act requires that a fee be paid, rather than permit the
parties to negotiate over the issue, primarily for equitable rea-
sons.21' A woman who turns over the use of her body to produce
another's child deserves substantial compensation for what she
has experienced, and the Act in Section 4(b) is making a
specific statement of public policy to that effect. The propriety
of rewarding the surrogate financially seems particularly com-
pelling when one considers that sperm donors used in artificial
insemination and ovum donors in surrogate embryo transfer
258. 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
259. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHLDREN OF ASSISFD CONCEPTION ACT § 6, 9b ULA 161-76
(Supp. 1995); Brophy, supra note 2, at 267.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
261. For a discussion of the controversy over payment of a fee to a surrogate
mother see supra text accompanying notes 201-13.
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are paid for their efforts.262 To insure that the surrogate
mother receives more than just a de minimis payment, the Act
establishes a $10,000 threshold, although there is nothing
sacrosanct about this particular figure.
Section 4(b) also makes clear that the proposed parent(s) are
not contracting to purchase a child, but only to purchase the
surrogate's reproductive services. Indeed, the additional
requirement that she be paid at least half of her parenting fee
prior to the birth was included to demonstrate that producing
a viable infant is not a prerequisite to being paid. Besides,
making this payment at that time also will provide for the sur-
rogate's needs to the extent she requires some additional
income during the course of the pregnancy.
Section 4(c) covers all the physical, psychological, and genetic
testing that the parties to the surrogate parenting agreement
must undergo as a prerequisite to obtaining the court's approv-
al of the contract. The purposes of such testing are:
(i) to ensure that the parties have the capacity to
give their informed consent to the surrogate
parenting agreement;
(ii) to be certain the surrogate is in proper physi-
cal and emotional condition to undergo preg-
nancy and childbirth;
(iii) to make sure the proposed parent(s) are in
good physical and emotional condition so they
can properly raise a child;
(iv) to ascertain whether all the parties are emo-
tionally prepared for the surrogacy process it-
self; and
(v) to rule out the possibility that any of them
carry any sexually transmitted diseases or
genetic defects or diseases that could be passed
along to the child.
It is particularly important that the surrogate mother, al-
though she does have the right to keep the child, receive a
thorough psychological examination to determine if she can
part with the child, since that is the expectation of the parties
and the whole purpose of the agreement.
262. Mandler, supra note 2, at 1307.
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Section 4(d) is designed to provide all parties with full disclo-
sure about the medical and criminal backgrounds of each other.
This is to ensure that the proposed parent(s) have been made
aware of any factor in the surrogate's background that might
disqualify her to be a surrogate mother and, correspondingly,
the surrogate can learn what kind of home the child will be
raised in. This will prevent what occurred in Johnson v.
Calvert,26a where the surrogate failed to reveal, prior to becom-
ing pregnant, that she had suffered several stillbirths and
miscarriages.26 4
Section 4(e) mirrors those provisions of the statute that give
the surrogate the right to retain custody of the child. It makes
explicit what is otherwise implicit- under the surrogate
parenting agreement, i.e., the surrogate's and her husband's
undertaking to relinquish custody of the child to the proposed
parent(s), unless the surrogate mother decides to keep the
child, in which case she and her husband agree to accept all
legal obligations of parenthood.
Pursuant to Section 4(f) of the proposed Model Act, the
surrogate is required to submit to necessary medical treatment
and to adhere to medically appropriate prenatal behavior,
which could include refraining from smoking, drinking, or other
behaviors agreed to by the parties. While the Act espouses the
desirability of such behavior, however, it also recognizes the
impossibility of enforcing a contractual provision mandating
the same. Courts traditionally have avoided specifically enforc-
ing personal service agreements because of the difficulty of
closely monitoring an individual's behavior to make sure he
complies with the court's directive.2 65 Although it has been
suggested that this type of provision should be the subject of
an action for specific performance,266 permitting this remedy
would be a misguided and ultimately fruitless effort to attain
a socially appropriate result.
Rather than put the courts into an intrusive role, requiring
that they keep close watch over the individual, the proposed
263. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
264. Id. at 778.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 366,367 (1979); see also Motown Record
Corp. v. Brockert, 207 Cal. Rptr. 574, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a perfor-
mance contract); In re Baby Boy C, 615 N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (N.Y. 1994) (involving an
agreement to adopt a child). For a discussion of some of the enforcement problems
with surrogate parenting agreements, see Coleman, supra note 163, at 82-91; Keane,
supra note 163, at 166-69.
266. Mandler, supra note 2, at 1312.
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Model Act employs monetary incentives to encourage the
surrogate mother to give the fetus proper prenatal care. Section
4(f) permits the parties to the agreement to stipulate contractu-
ally to pay the surrogate a bonus if she provides all the care
that is required.
Under Section 4(g), the proposed parents have no choice but
to accept custody of the child after birth, regardless of its
physical or mental condition. This is intended to avoid the case
where the parents decide they do not want a developmentally
disabled child and attempt to decline responsibility for it.
There have been several such cases involving surrogates. 267 The
Act attempts to impress upon the proposed parents the serious-
ness of their obligation by also providing in a subsequent
section 26 8 that as a condition of obtaining judicial approval of
the surrogacy agreement, they must post a surety bond or
letter of credit with the court to indemnify the state for all
costs incurred in the care and placement of the child if they
refuse to accept custody.
269
Section 4(h) addresses who is in control of the surrogate's
pregnancy and her right to have an elective abortion. This
Section requires that the surrogate parenting agreement
provide that the surrogate and her physician have the sole
decision-making authority in this regard. This language is
intended to put to rest any notion that the surrogate mother
sacrifices her right to control her bodily integrity just because
she has agreed to have a baby for someone else's benefit.
The practical consequence of this section is that not only is
the surrogate's right to an abortion upheld, but also that she
retains the right to make whatever medical decisions are
necessary during the course of the pregnancy just as if it were
her own child. Only the surrogate can determine ultimately
whether she should undergo any particular procedure or treat-
ment. Indeed, Section 4(f) does not even require her to submit
to procedures, such as ultrasound and amniocentesis, designed
to determine the sex of the fetus or to determine whether it
exhibits any mental or physical defects. She may do so volun-
tarily, and the proposed parent(s) are permitted to compensate
her for her cooperation.
267. See KEANE & BREO, supra note 2, at 300-01; Tiller, supra note 10, at 420 &
n.50. On the issue of custody, see Coleman, supra note 163, at 103-07 (describing the
"best interests of the child" standard).
268. MODEL ACT § 7(c).
269. Id.
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The approach taken by the Act on the issue of decision
making during pregnancy is consistent with the position of
the courts in other cases involving bodily integrity. In Curran
v. Bosze,27 ° the Illinois Supreme Court refused to compel
three-year-old twins to submit to a bone marrow harvesting
procedure in order to determine whether they could donate
bone marrow to their half brother, who suffered from leuke-
mia.2 1 Because the children were not old enough to have
developed the power of self-determination and were not capa-
ble of making an informed, rational decision, the court would
not apply the doctrine of substituted judgment, which is used
to make decisions based on the presumed wishes of an incom-
petent patient.272 Instead, the court decided that the proce-
dure was not in the best interests of the children, primarily
because their mother objected.273 In so ruling, it affirmed the
doctrine that a patient must consent to medical treatment of
any kind before it can be administered and has the corre-
sponding right to refuse any proposed treatment.274
Perhaps even more relevant is the decision by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re A. C. 275 A hospital sought
authority to perform a caesarean delivery of the fetus of a
terminally ill patient, whose views on the subject could not be
determined with any degree of accuracy.276 The court held that
a patient has the right to decide what is to be done on behalf
of herself and her fetus, and that substituted judgment should
apply because the patient was not capable of giving informed
consent.277 In announcing its decision it stated that any patient
has the right to make an informed choice to accept or forego
medical treatment and that courts should not balance the
rights of the woman against the interests of the state. 278 The
duty of the court is to determine the patient's wishes by any
means available, and it must abide by those wishes unless
there are truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to override
them.279
270. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
271. Id. at 1345.
272. Id. at 1326.
273. Id. at 1345.
274. Id. at 1323.
275. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
276. Id. at 1238.
277. Id. at 1249-52.
278. See id. at 1252.
279. Id. at 1243, 1244. For more on this subject, see Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (ordering emergency caesarean
section when the survival of fetus was endangered); Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397
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Initially, it may appear incongruous to permit a surrogate
to have an abortion when to do so would defeat the entire pur-
pose of the surrogate parenting agreement. The rationale is
actually quite straightforward. Because the United States
Supreme Court has decreed that a woman has a right to
undergo an abortion under certain circumstances,8 ° the Act is
not going to impinge upon the surrogate's constitutionally
protected freedom of choice. Even if the surrogate were agree-
able, it is far from clear that a person could waive such a
constitutional right contractually.28 ' The debate over this issue
is academic for purposes of the Act, however, because it is
predicated on the notion that a woman should not be required
to give up any of her constitutional rights in order to become
a surrogate mother.282 Moreover, because the surrogate can
deprive the proposed parent(s) of custody of the child by exer-
cising her right to keep her baby within the first seventy-two
hours after birth, the proposed parent(s) are no worse off if the
surrogate decides to abort.283
(Mass. 1983) (refusing to order operation on pregnant woman to save the pregnancy
when she was opposed to it for religious reasons); Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices
During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 591,623 (1989)
(delineating policy reasons against overriding choice of treatment, such as creating
incentives against seeking medical treatment); Robertson, supra note 53, at 442
(arguing that a woman who decides to bring a child into the world loses the bodily
freedom to harm it).
280. In the most recent decision on the subject, Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833 (1992), the Court for the first time moved away
from strict adherence to the trimester analysis announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 US.
113 (1973), and toward a standard based upon whether an undue burden has been
placed on the woman's right to have an abortion. Planned Parenthood, 505 US. at
876, 877.
281. See FIELD, supra note 2, at 64-65; Coleman, supra note 163, at 85 & n.70;
Mandler, supra note 2, at 1313-16.
282. Contrast the Act's approach to decision making during pregnancy and the
right to have an abortion with the approach of the Surrogate Parenting Agreement
at issue in the Baby M case. Section 13 of the Surrogate Parenting Agreement
prohibited the surrogate mother from having an elective abortion unless the child was
physiologically abnormal. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1268 (N.J. 1988). The
Agreement also required her to undergo testing to determine whether the fetus had
any genetic or congenital defects, and, if so, required that she abort the fetus upon
the proposed father's demand. Id.
283. It is true that in ending the pregnancy she will deprive the proposed parent(s)
of custody of the child and their own rights of parentage, but even if one were inclined
to prohibit the surrogate from exercising this right, there is no way to enforce such
a prohibition. If the surrogate wanted an abortion badly enough, she would simply
go out and get one; how could she be prevented from doing so, short of keeping her
in custody for the entire pregnancy?
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While the statute therefore does not interfere with the surro-
gate's ability to exercise her right to have an abortion, it allows
the parties to create a financial disincentive by forfeiting her
parenting fee. This solution represents another attempt by the
statute to accommodate reasonably the interests of the parents
in obtaining a child as a result of the surrogacy relationship
and the surrogate mother's right to control what goes on in her
own body. This tension is an inherent element in the surrogacy
process, a tension that the Act recognizes and seeks to amelio-
rate to the greatest extent possible.
Section 4(i) addresses the payment of the surrogate's fee in
the event of physical misfortune, an issue that has caused
much difficulty for the courts and commentators who attempt
to determine the true purpose of her compensation.8 4 It states
that, in the event the surrogate suffers a miscarriage, the
proposed parents shall pay all expenses incident thereto and
half of the parenting fee. Under Section 4(i)(2), when a still-
birth occurs, or the child dies after birth, the surrogate receives
all of her expenses and her fee.
Medically necessary abortions and miscarriages are treated
alike under Sections 4(h)(1) and 4(i)(1), respectively, because
they are viewed as unintended events for which no particular
party is responsible but which nevertheless result in the
ultimate failure of the surrogacy relationship. Under these
circumstances it is difficult to provide an equitable adjustment
of the various parties' interests because no one is at "fault."
The statute's approach is simply to apportion the financial
detriment on an equal basis by awarding the surrogate one-half
of her fee. She is entitled to some part of that fee because she
partially performed the services for which she was to receive
payment-to become pregnant, carry a child to term, and give
birth. On the other hand, the proposed parent(s) should not
have to pay the entire amount because they did not receive
everything to which the parties agreed.
Others have tried to develop more complicated schemes for
compensating a surrogate where a miscarriage occurs, with the
payment depending upon the stage of the pregnancy. For
example, one author has suggested that the proposed parent(s)
be required to pay one-third of the surrogate's fee to her if the
miscarriage happens within the first thirteen weeks and must
pay two-thirds of the total fee in the event that the miscarriage
284. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71, 81-85, 89-96.
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occurs between the fourteenth and twenty-seventh weeks of
gestation.28 This or a similar approach easily could fit within
the conceptual framework of the Act. The Act's requirement of
an even division of the financial loss between the proposed
parent(s) and the surrogate chiefly has the virtue of simplicity
of administration, but it could be modified if the need to do so
became apparent.
In the event of a stillbirth or the death of the baby during
or after childbirth, the surrogate mother has fulfilled all of her
obligations under the surrogate parenting agreement, and thus
Section 4(i)(2) requires that the proposed parents pay her in
full. Although this would be a great tragedy for all parties
involved, it is unfortunately one of the risks of surrogate
motherhood to which the proposed parent(s) are subject, as
with any other pregnancy, and it should have no bearing upon
their duty to compensate the surrogate mother.
Section 4(k) imposes additional financial duties upon the
proposed parent(s) for the benefit of the surrogate or the child
to be conceived. They must purchase term life insurance for
themselves, payable in trust to the unborn child, plus term
insurance on the life of the surrogate payable to a beneficiary
of her choice. This insurance must stay in effect for six months
after the birth of the child. The purpose of the former is to
make sure there are sufficient financial resources to care for
the newborn if one or both of the proposed parent(s) has died.
The latter is to protect the surrogate's family if she should not
survive the rigors of pregnancy and childbirth. The statute
does not use any particular figures for the amount of insurance
required, leaving that determination to each state that adopts
the law.
Although the provisions of all relevant statutes are deemed
incorporated into the terms of any contract,286 Section 4(m) is
added to impress upon the parties that they are not simply
entering into a private, consensual arrangement to have a
baby, but that the public policy of the state, as expressed in the
proposed Model Act, is an integral part of their agreement.
285. Mandler, supra note 2, at 1309.
286. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117, 130 (1991).
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SECTION 5. PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
(a) Within ninety (90) days after entering into a surro-
gate parenting agreement, and prior to commencement of
any non-coital reproductive techniques to impregnate the
surrogate, all parties to the agreement shall jointly file a
petition with the court seeking preliminary approval of the
agreement. The signature of a party to the petition shall
constitute the entry of a general appearance in the action
and that party's consent to the jurisdiction of the court to
enter the various orders described in this Act.
(b) The petition shall contain the following:
(1) The names and current place of residence of the
petitioners;
(2) The date of birth of all petitioners;
(3) A statement that one or more of the proposed par-
ent(s) is infertile, a description of the nature of the infer-
tility, and a description of all efforts to have a natural or
adopted child, including the length of time spent for each
method;
(4) A statement by the surrogate giving the name and
address of counsel who represented her in negotiating the
agreement, the date of birth of all of her natural children
that she has given birth to without complication within the
previous five years, and a description of any complications
during pregnancy or childbirth that she has experienced at
any time in the past;
(5) The method by which the surrogate will be im-
pregnated and the names of the physicians and facility
where the procedure will be performed;
(6) The fees to be paid to the surrogate; and
(7) The relation, if any, between the proposed parent(s)
and the surrogate.
(c) As exhibits to the petition, the parties shall attach an
executed copy of the surrogate parenting agreement and
copies of the results of all required physical, genetic and
psychological examinations, testing and counseling.
(d) The petition shall be verified under oath by each of
the petitioners.
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(e) At the preliminary and final hearings on the petition
described in Sections 6 and 7, the proposed parent(s) shall
have the burden of proof on all issues.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 5
Section 5 is the first part of the statute that concerns itself
with the method for judicial review and approval of the sur-
rogate parenting arrangement among the parties. The need for
such oversight before the surrogate becomes pregnant is
exemplified by the conflicts that arose in In re Baby M 287 and
Johnson v. Calvert. 81 Surrogate motherhood cannot be treated
as an ordinary contractual relationship between private parties
who only look to the courts as an arbiter of last resort. The
lives of several people are profoundly affected, including that
of a child yet to be conceived, and the vagaries of the market-
place are ill-equipped to order the relationships among them.
Therefore, it is the intent of the proposed Model Act to ana-
lyze the situation as a family law matter and treat it as much
as possible as an adoption proceeding, with the concomitant
protections for the birth mother and the child, as noted in
Surrogate Parenting Associates Inc. v. Commonwealth ex. rel.
Armstrong289 and In re Baby M. 290 Obviously, there still must
be a recognition of the differences between surrogate mother-
hood and adoption, principally in the pre-planning of the birth
and payment of a fee to the mother, which occurs in the for-
mer. But by providing for advance judicial approval of the
parenting contract and of the parties to the surrogate arrange-
ment, as well as requiring a home visit by an investigator to
the proposed parent(s) and permitting the surrogate mother to
retain the child after birth, the statute attempts to ensure that
the newborn ends up in a good home with nurturing parents
who will provide a positive environment for raising a child.
The Act contemplates a two-part judicial procedure, with
the court first holding a preliminary hearing to approve the
surrogate parenting agreement and then, after the home
visit, holding a final hearing sixty to ninety days after its
287. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). See supra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
288. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). See supra notes 133-61 and accompanying text.
289. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
290. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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initial order of approval. Although one of the purposes of this
procedure is to give the investigator time to make the home
visit and prepare his or her report prior to the court's final
review, another purpose of the delay in judicial approval is to
give the parties a "cooling off" period where they can re-think
their commitment to the endeavor and withdraw if need be at
an early stage when less is at stake.
Under Section 5, within ninety days after executing the
surrogate parenting agreement, all the parties are required to
file a petition with the court to obtain preliminary approval of
that document. The petition must show on its face that the
parties qualify for surrogate parenthood, i.e., that one or more
of the proposed parent(s) is infertile and that the surrogate is
of the proper age and has not experienced any problems with
a pregnancy within the last five years. It also requires that
the agreement itself, plus the results of all genetic, physical,
and psychological testing, be attached as exhibits to the
petition. The petition must be verified as true and correct by
each of the petitioners. Because the proposed parent(s) are the
primary parties interested in obtaining the court's approval of
the surrogate arrangement, it is appropriate that they have
the burden of proof on all factual matters.
SECTION 6. PRELIMINARY HEARING ON PETITION
(a) The court shall hold a preliminary hearing on the
petition within thirty (30) days after filing. It shall appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child
to be conceived under the surrogate parenting agreement.
The court shall also appoint counsel for the surrogate if
she is not already represented by counsel, except in cases
of related surrogacy, where the surrogate need not be
represented by counsel.
(b) The court shall enter an order granting preliminary
approval of the surrogate parenting agreement if it finds,
upon a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) The court has jurisdiction over the petitioners.
(2) The proposed parent(s), the surrogate, and surro-
gate's husband, if any, meet all the eligibility requirements
contained in this Act.
(3) The proposed parent(s), the surrogate, and the sur-
rogate's husband, if any, have each executed the surrogate
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parenting agreement in the exercise of their informed
consent and understand all of its terms and provisions and
the purpose and effect thereof.
(4) The surrogate parenting agreement contains all the
provisions required by Section 4 of this Act and includes
no provision in conflict with the terms hereof or which the
court otherwise finds unconscionable.
(5) All terms of the surrogate parenting agreement
have been agreed upon by the parties thereto as the result
of negotiations conducted in good faith. No party has been
induced to become a signatory to the agreement as the
result of any misrepresentation, omission of material fact,
coercion, or duress.
(6) All required physical, genetic, and psychological
examinations, testing and counseling required hereunder
have been completed by the petitioners and disclose that:
(A) The proposed parent(s), surrogate, and surro-
gate's husband, if any, are physically and psychologically
capable of performing their duties and responsibilities
under the surrogate parenting agreement;
(B) There is less than a twenty-five percent chance
that a genetic disease, defect or abnormality will be passed
on to the child to be conceived under the surrogate
parenting agreement;
(C) None of the parties to the agreement are
currently in treatment for alcoholism or chemical depen-
dency or have received such treatment within three years
prior to the execution of the agreement;
(D) One or more of the proposed parent(s) is infer-
tile;
(E) The surrogate is in good physical health, is not
infected with any sexually transmitted disease or the HIV
virus, is physically and psychologically able to undergo
pregnancy and childbirth without serious risk to her physi-
cal or mental health or that of the fetus, and both she and
her husband, if any, are psychologically capable of turning
over the child to the proposed parent(s), thereby relin-
quishing her parental rights;
(F) The proposed parent(s) and donor, if known,
are in good physical condition and are not infected by any
sexually transmitted disease or the HIV virus, and
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(G) The proposed parent(s) do not have any mental
illness, defect, or disorder that would impair their ability
to raise a child.
(7) The proposed parent(s) have attempted to have a
child through means other than sexual intercourse, wheth-
er via adoption or otherwise, for at least two (2) consecu-
tive years prior to entering into the agreement.
(8) The surrogate's expenses incurred prior to filing the
petition and any part of her fee earned to date have been
paid in full by the proposed parent(s).
(9) All petitioners understand the nature, purpose, and
effect of the proceedings before the court.
(c) At the hearing, in addition to the evidence presented
by the parties, the court may require the submission of
such additional information or documentation about the
petitioners or the agreement, require the testimony or
further testimony of any of the petitioners, or require the
parties to produce any other individual for examination, as
the court determines is necessary.
(d) After having reviewed all the evidence, the court
shall enter an order either granting or denying prelimi-
nary approval to the surrogate parenting agreement. If the
court enters an order denying the petition, it shall specify
the reasons therefor. If in the court's judgment the bases
for denial of the petition can be remedied by the petition-
ers, then the denial shall be without prejudice, and the
court shall grant the petitioners such additional time as it
deems appropriate for the filing of an amended petition.
Should the court determine that the bases for denial of the
petition are not capable of being remedied the order deny-
ing the petition shall be with prejudice.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 6
The preliminary review provided for in Section 6 is intended
to ensure that the parties have met all the initial requirements
imposed by the statute-that the surrogate parenting agree-
ment was voluntarily executed without duress, that it contains
all of the provisions required by Section 4, that the results of
the various tests and examinations do not exclude any of the
petitioners from participation in surrogate parenting, and
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similar matters. Under Section 6(a), the court is required to
hold the preliminary hearing within thirty days after the
petition is filed, with a guardian ad litem appointed to repre-
sent the unborn child and counsel appointed for the surrogate
if she is not already represented by counsel of her own choos-
ing. Although this section is silent on this point, the cost of the
surrogate's counsel is to be borne by the proposed parent(s)
pursuant to Section 4(b).
Under Section 6(b), the court is authorized to enter prelimi-
nary approval of the surrogate parenting agreement provided
each of the following conditions is met:
(1)-(3) The court has jurisdiction over the parties, who
meet all of the eligibility requirements of the proposed Act and
who have each executed the agreement in the exercise of their
informed consent. The term "eligibility requirements" is a
reference to the definitions of surrogate, proposed mother, and
proposed father contained in Section 2.
(4) The surrogate parenting agreement contains all of the
terms required by this Act and none of them conflict with the
provisions hereof; in addition, there are no other contract
terms that the court finds to be unconscionable. This last
requirement gives the court the means to invalidate contractu-
al language that, although not specifically contrary to the stat-
ute, is determined to be onerous, one-sided, or especially
unfair. It is contemplated that the court would strike a provi-
sion as unconscionable in order to protect the child or the
surrogate; it seems quite unlikely that the proposed parent(s)
would need the protection of the court for this purpose.
(5) There is a separate requirement that the surrogate
parenting agreement have been negotiated in good faith in the
absence of any coercion, duress, or misrepresentation.
(6) The results of the physical and psychological tests
must show that all parties are physically and emotionally able
to perform their duties and responsibilities under the par-
enting agreement. Part of this requirement, which is made
explicit in Section 6(b)(6)(E), is that the surrogate is in proper
physical condition to undergo the rigors of childbirth. Addi-
tionally, she and her husband, if she has one, must be psycho-
logically able to part with the child, even though she has the
right to change her mind and retain custody of it.
A separate requirement is that the genetic tests must reveal
a less than twenty-five percent chance of a genetic disease or
defect being passed on to the child to be conceived. The Act
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does not attempt to list the objectionable genetic defects that
would qualify under this section because there are so many
possible types of genetic abnormalities, with more being dis-
covered all the time, that it would be impossible to keep the
statute up to date. Also, it would be inappropriate to choose
which genetic defects were permitted in the child and which
were not. A blanket prohibition is a far more equitable way of
handling the issue and has the advantage of steering clear of
the whole subject of eugenics. The standard of a less than
twenty-five percent chance of passing along a genetic defect is
not written in stone, but anything higher seems to carry too
much of a risk to the child.
None of the participants is permitted to be in treatment for
alcoholism or chemical dependency or to have received any such
treatment in the three years prior to execution of the parenting
agreement. This is designed as a prophylactic measure to weed
out individuals who have had recent alcohol or chemical de-
pendency problems. If a person had such difficulties in the past,
three years without the need for treatment seemed to be a
reasonable period to indicate that she has overcome these
particular problems.
At least one of the parent(s) must be infertile. Recall that
that term is defined very broadly to include the inability to
conceive a child during one year of sexual intercourse as well
as being at risk for transmitting a genetic disease or defect.
For women, this also includes the inability to carry a preg-
nancy to term or to undergo pregnancy and childbirth without
serious medical risk to herself or the fetus.29' The reason for
the inclusion of this prerequisite is simple: the philosophy of
the Act is that surrogacy is intended only to be used by people
who cannot obtain a child in any other way. Those who desire
to use the services of a surrogate mother simply because they
do not want to undergo the inconvenience of pregnancy and
childbirth will not be permitted to do so, even though some
commentators believe that it would be constitutionally imper-
missible to bar the use of a surrogate in that situation.292
(7) This overall philosophy is also apparent in the require-
ments imposed by Section 6(b)(7), which provides that the
proposed parent(s) have attempted to have a child through
291. MODEL ACT § 2. The traditional definition of infertility is the inability to
conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse. Hey, supra note 27, at 776 n.5.
292. Robertson, supra note 53, at 429-32.
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means other than sexual intercourse for at least two consecu-
tive years prior to entering into the surrogate parenting agree-
ment. This can include adoption or any means of assisted
reproduction, such as IVF or artificial insemination.
(8) All of the surrogate's expenses to date must have been
paid in full.
(9) The petitioners understand the nature and purpose of
the proceeding.
The court under Section 6(c) may require the submission of
any evidence it deems necessary to assist it in rendering its
decision or require the testimony of any of the petitioners or
third persons. The purpose is to give the court very wide lati-
tude in determining exactly what kind of evidence it needs in
order to find all of the elements listed above before granting
its preliminary approval of the agreement. The Act contem-
plates that in ruling upon a petition to approve a surrogate
parenting contract, the judge will take a very active role in the
proceeding, far more active than is normally the case.
The court shall thereafter issue its ruling. If the petition is
denied, the reasons for the denial must be stated for the
record. To the extent the deficiencies in the petition can be
remedied, denial should be without prejudice and the petition-
ers granted leave to file an amended petition. Otherwise the
denial of the preliminary approval should be with prejudice.
SECTION 7. FINAL HEARING ON PETITION
(a) If the court enters an order granting preliminary
approval of the surrogate parenting agreement, it shall set
the matter for final hearing sixty (60) to ninety (90) days
thereafter. Except in a related surrogacy, the court shall
order an investigation, to be completed prior to the final
hearing, into the fitness of the proposed parent(s) in the
same manner as under [the adoption laws of this state],
including a home visit to the proposed parent(s)' residence.
The marital status of the proposed parent(s) or their sex-
ual orientation shall not be considered in making a fitness
determination. The information obtained as a result of the
investigation shall be presented to the court in a written
report that shall be made available to all the parties. In no
event shall any facts set forth in the report be considered
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at the final hearing unless established by competent
evidence. The proposed parent(s) shall be given the oppor-
tunity to rebut any adverse findings of the report, in-
cluding the right to examine the individual(s) who made
the investigation. The report shall be filed with the record
of the proceeding.
(b) At the final hearing, each of the petitioners shall
testify regarding their continued desire to proceed with the
surrogate parenting agreement, their understanding of and
agreement with the terms thereof, and their ability to carry
out their obligations thereunder, including the surrogate's
agreement to give up her parental rights in the child to be
conceived under the agreement. The proposed parent(s)
shall submit evidence that the required life insurance
policies have been obtained. The court may require any
other evidence or testimony from the petitioners or any
other persons that it determines is necessary. Except in
cases of related surrogacy, as a condition of obtaining final
approval of the surrogate parenting agreement, the pro-
posed parent(s) must deposit the following with the court:
(1) A surety bond from a surety company licensed to do
business in [this state] or a letter of credit from a financial
institution regulated by [this state] or the United States
government in the minimum amount of Dollars
($-) to guaranty payment of all the surrogate's expenses
and the parenting fee.
(2) A surety bond or letter of credit from like sources
in the minimum amount of Dollars ($-) to indem-
nify [this state] and its agencies, instrumentalities, and
subdivisions for all costs incurred in the care and place-
ment of a child born to a surrogate where custody is
refused by the proposed parent(s) or where they are unable
to accept custody for any reason.
(3) The court may, in its discretion, after an order of
final approval has been entered, order the proposed par-
ent(s) to increase the amount of any surety bond, letter of
credit, or life insurance policy required hereunder if the
circumstances warrant.
(c)(1) The court shall enter a final order of approval of the
surrogate parenting agreement upon finding, based upon
a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(A) There has been no material change in any of
the petitioners' physical or psychological condition since the
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entry of the order granting preliminary approval to the
surrogate parenting agreement that would affect their eligi-
bility for surrogate parenting under this Act;
(B) All life insurance and surety bonds or letters
of credit required by Sections 4(k) and 7(c) are in place in
the proper amounts;
(C) The proposed parent(s) will provide a nurturing
and wholesome environment for the child who is to be born
to the surrogate and will be able to meet all of the child's
physical, emotional, and financial needs;
(D) All amounts owing to the surrogate under the
surrogate parenting agreement have been paid; and
(E) All requirements of this Act have otherwise
been met.
(2) The court's order shall discharge the guardian ad
litem and any counsel appointed for the surrogate and
authorize the parties to the agreement to begin procedures
for non-coital reproduction. It shall further provide for the
termination of the surrogate's parental rights effective
seventy-two (72) hours after she gives birth, or up to thirty-
three (33) days after giving birth if the provisions of Section
9(g) apply, unless the surrogate mother elects to keep the
child as provided in Section 9, in which case her parental
rights shall remain in full force and effect. The order shall
also include the written address of all parties for any
notices to be sent pursuant to Sections 8 or 9 hereof.
(d) Except in cases of related surrogacy, confidentiality
of the preliminary and final hearings conducted under Sec-
tions 6 and 7, and the child's right to learn the identity of
the surrogate shall be governed by the same standards as
provided in [the adoption laws of this state].
(e) Except in cases of related surrogacy, if the court
enters an order denying either preliminary or final approv-
al of the surrogate parenting agreement, the proposed
parent(s) shall remain liable for payment of all the surro-
gate's expenses incurred through the date of the order;
provided, however, that if the court's denial was predicated
upon the surrogate's current physical condition, medical
history, prior experience with pregnancy and childbirth, or
any other factor concerning her eligibility to serve as a
surrogate, and such facts were not previously disclosed or
were misrepresented to the proposed parent(s), then the
proposed parent(s) shall not be required to pay any of the
Proposed Surrogate Parenthood Act
surrogate's expenses and the court shall order the surro-
gate to repay all such amounts expended on her behalf as
well as any part of the parenting fee she had received. In
addition, the surrogate shall reimburse the proposed
parent(s) for all of their medical and other expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred since the
execution of the surrogate parenting agreement.
(f) After entering a final order approving the surrogate
parenting agreement, the court shall retain jurisdiction of
the matter until the child born to the surrogate has reached
the age of three (3) months.
(g) Except in cases of related surrogacy, after entry of a
final order of approval, the petitioners may not alter or
amend the surrogate parenting agreement without the
court's consent, except as otherwise provided in Section 8
regarding termination of the agreement.
(h) The marriage, legal separation, or divorce of a surro-
gate subsequent to the final order of approval of the sur-
rogate parenting agreement shall have no effect upon the
validity of the court's order, and the surrogate's new
husband is not required to consent to the parties' agree-
ment.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 7
If the court preliminarily approves the surrogate parenting
agreement, a final hearing is scheduled for sixty to ninety days
thereafter. During that time, an investigation will be made into
the fitness of the proposed parent(s) in the same manner as
under the state's adoption laws, including a home visit to their
residence. The purpose of this is to make sure that the pro-
posed parent(s) will be proper parents for the child, able to
provide a wholesome environment that meets the child's
physical, emotional, and financial needs. This section under-
scores the point that the state has a vital interest in the
surrogate parenting process and in protecting the child to be
conceived as part of that process under its parens patriae
power.
Section 7(a) makes clear that neither the marital status of
the proposed parent(s) nor their sexual orientation is to be con-
sidered in determining fitness. This language was included not
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because of a belief that unmarried and homosexual people have
a constitutional right29 3 to have access to all available techno-
logy in aid of reproduction but because of fairness and equity
considerations. If they otherwise meet all the tests for being
good parents, what is the justification for excluding them from
participation in surrogate parenting arrangements? As ex-
plained in the discussion of constitutional issues, 294 no state
bars single people from adopting,29 5 and no state that permits
the use of IVF with sperm donors requires the woman to be
married.2 9 This hardly lends credence to the notion that the
states have shown a preference for married couples as parents
rather than unmarried individuals, at least as far as adoption
and assisted reproduction are concerned.
Section 7(b) requires that each of the petitioners testify at
the final hearing so the court can determine whether they still
intend to proceed with the surrogate parenting arrangement
and whether they understand the terms of the contract and can
carry them out. As with the preliminary hearing, the court can
consider any other evidence it deems relevant to the issues.
Section 7(c) requires the posting of two surety bonds or
letters of credit with the court by the proposed parent(s). The
amounts have not been specified in order to allow each state
to determine for itself what it considers appropriate. The first
is to guarantee payment of all of the surrogate's expenses and
her parenting fee. The other is for the benefit of the state in
the event the proposed parent(s) refuse custody of the child; it
is intended to cover all expenses of caring for that child until
a suitable permanent home can be found for it. 297 The court is
also given the authority in § 7(3)(c) to order the proposed
parent(s) to increase these amounts if needed.
Under Section 7(d)(1) the court will enter an order of final
approval of the surrogate parenting agreement if it finds that
there has been no material change in any of the petitioners'
physical or psychological condition since the entry of the order
of preliminary approval, all life insurance and the surety
bonds or letters of credit are in place, the proposed parent(s)
have been determined to be fit, all amounts owed by them to
293. See supra text accompanying notes 216-31.
294. See generally supra Part III.
295. See supra text accompanying note 221.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 222-23.
297. See MODEL ACT § 11 regarding the ramifications of the parents' refusal to take
custody of the child.
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the surrogate have been paid to date, and all requirements of
the statute have otherwise been met. The order of final ap-
proval will discharge the guardian ad litem and authorize the
parties to begin procedures for non-coital reproduction. The
order also will terminate the surrogate's parental rights
effective seventy-two hours after the birth of the child unless
Section 9(g) applies, which extends for up to thirty days the
surrogate's right to decide to keep the child if she suffers from
some physical or psychological condition which prevents her
from making this choice during the initial seventy-two hour
post-partum period. If she chooses to keep the baby as provid-
ed in Section 9, then her parental rights will not be affected by
the court's order. After entry of the final order, the parties
cannot amend the agreement in any manner without first
obtaining the court's consent, though they may terminate it by
following the procedures set forth in Section 8.
Section 7(e) addresses confidentiality of the proceedings and
the child's right to know the identity of the surrogate. These
are quite complex issues that involve the possibly conflicting
interests of several parties. These are also issues which are
not especially unique to surrogate parenthood per se. There-
fore, it would be appropriate simply to incorporate the state's
confidentiality laws as they apply to adoptions rather than
having an entirely separate confidentiality statute applicable
to surrogate parenting arrangements. The legislatures have
already gone through the process of determining where the
public interest lies in the area of confidentiality of adoptions,
and there is no good reason to upset that prior judgment.298
The court retains jurisdiction of the matter after the child is
born in order to implement Section 9 of the Act if the surro-
gate mother exercises her right to keep the child. The three-
month period provided for in Section 7(g) is sufficient for the
court to hold the hearing required by Section 9(d) within the
time frame stated therein and to accommodate a hearing
delayed by the application of Section 9(g).
298. For example, the California Family Code provides, inter alia, that records of
adoption proceedings are not available for inspection to anyone except the parties and
their attorneys, unless authorized by a judge upon a showing of good cause in excep-
tional circumstances. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9200-06 (West 1994). With the written
consent of the adoptee's birth parents, their identity and location may be disclosed
to the adopted person once she has reached the age of 21. Id. § 9203(a)(1). Likewise,
parents who have given up a child for adoption can learn the adopted name and
whereabouts of their child once she has reached age 21 and has given her consent in
writing. Id.
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Finally, under Section 7(i), the proposed Model Act provides
that the subsequent marriage, legal separation, or divorce of
the surrogate will have no effect on the validity of the court's
final order of approval, and the consent of the surrogate's new
husband to the agreement is not needed. This provision was
added to simplify matters in the event the surrogate's marital
status changed during the course of the parenting agreement;
it would be too cumbersome procedurally if further court
hearings were needed every time this occurred. Moreover, it
would add an unnecessary level of uncertainty for the pro-
posed parent(s). To the extent the surrogate's new husband
prefers that she not give up the child, he could try to convince
her to exercise her rights to retain custody in the first seventy-
two hours after birth.
SECTION 8. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
Except in cases of related surrogacy:
(a) Prior to the entry of an order of final approval of a
surrogate parenting agreement by the court pursuant to
Section 7(d), the surrogate or the proposed parent(s) may
terminate the agreement by serving written notice upon the
other parties by personal delivery, certified mail, return
receipt requested, or by any other method for delivery of
documents generally accepted in commercial practice, to the
address stated in the final order of approval or any subse-
quent address filed with the court upon notice to all par-
ties. Termination will be deemed effective upon personal
delivery to any of the parties themselves, or three days
after deposit in the United States mail or with such deliv-
ery service, whichever is applicable. Service may be made
by any of the parties to the surrogacy agreement, their
counsel, or anyone eighteen years of age or older who has
not previously been declared mentally incompetent. If there
is a pending proceeding in court for approval of the agree-
ment, a copy of the notice of termination also shall be
provided to the court within seven days after delivery, with
an affidavit of service. Upon such termination the surrogate
parenting agreement will be considered null and void, and
all parties thereto will be relieved of any further duties and
obligations thereunder. The agreement may provide, in the
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event of termination prior to court approval, for any finan-
cial adjustment between the parties as they may agree,
which provision shall survive the termination of the agree-
ment.
(b) The surrogate has the right to terminate the surrogate
parenting agreement at any time after court approval and
prior to the birth of the child as stated in this Section 8(b).
She shall provide written notice of termination to other
parties to the agreement, with a copy thereof filed with the
court, as stated in Section 8(a). The court shall thereupon
enter an order terminating the surrogate parenting agree-
ment and vacating its previous order(s) of approval. If the
surrogate is pregnant at the time, she shall be considered
the legal mother of the child to be born to her and her hus-
band, if a party to the parenting agreement, shall be
considered the legal father, unless a different individual is
established as the father in a paternity proceeding. The en-
try of such an order of termination will relieve all parties
to the agreement from any further duties and obligations
thereunder. The proposed parent(s) shall not be liable for
any of the surrogate's expenses nor for the parenting fee,
and the surrogate shall repay all such amounts previously
paid on her behalf plus all costs incurred by the proposed
parent(s) to date, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
The surrogate's right to terminate the surrogate parent-
ing agreement after the birth of the child is governed by
the procedure set forth in Section 9.
(c)(1) After court approval, but prior to the surrogate's
becoming pregnant, the proposed parent(s) may terminate
the surrogate parenting agreement by sending written
notice of termination to the surrogate and to the court in
the manner provided for in Section 8(a). The court shall
thereupon enter an order terminating the agreement and
vacating its prior order(s) of approval, which shall relieve
all parties of any further duties and obligations thereunder.
The entry of such an order is expressly conditioned upon
proof of payment to the surrogate of all her costs and ex-
penses to date, including any attorneys' fees incurred by
virtue of the termination proceeding hereunder.
(2) The surrogate parenting agreement shall not be
terminated by the proposed parent(s) subsequent to the
surrogate becoming pregnant unless with the consent of the
surrogate and the court that entered the order of final
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approval of the agreement. Written notice of any such
intended termination and filing a copy thereof with the
court shall be required by Section 8(a). The court shall con-
duct a hearing and permit such termination only if it finds
that the consent of the surrogate was made voluntarily and
without coercion or while under duress. Upon making such
a finding and determining that the proposed parent(s) have
paid all the surrogate's costs and expenses to date, includ-
ing whatever portion of the parenting fee has been earned
and reasonable attorneys' fees, the court shall vacate the
previous orders approving the agreement, reinstate the
surrogate's parental rights, and declare the surrogate
parenting agreement to be terminated. Upon entry of the
order, the proposed parent(s) shall be relieved of all legal
responsibility for the child to be born to the surrogate.
Parentage of the child shall be as stated in Section 8(b).
COMMENTS TO SECTION 8
Section 8 governs the procedures for termination of the
surrogate parenting agreement by the parties. These proce-
dures vary depending upon whether the termination occurs
before or after the court's final order of approval and whether
the surrogate or the proposed parent(s) wish to terminate the
agreement. The easiest situation is that described in Section
8(a) where termination occurs prior to the approval order. All
that is required is that one party notify the other in writing;
if a proceeding in court has already been initiated, a copy of
the notice is also sent to the judge. No meaningful judicial
involvement is contemplated however; this particular procedure
is entirely self-effectuating. Upon receipt of the notice, the
surrogate parenting agreement is deemed null and void. Rather
than restricting the acceptable methods of service of notice to
personal delivery or through the use of the U.S. mails, Section
8 (along with Section 9(b) regarding notice of intent to retain
the child) permit service by any generally accepted method of
delivering original documents used in general commerce (e.g.
U.P.S., Federal Express, etc.).
The only possible issue at this juncture would be the pro-
posed parent(s)' expenses to date, the surrogate's expenses that
they have paid, and payment of any portion of the parenting
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fee. These are not deemed of sufficient importance to require
any particular treatment by the proposed Model Act. Rather,
the parties are left to determine for themselves whether there
will be any financial adjustment between them.
The rights of the surrogate and proposed parent(s) to termi-
nate the agreement subsequent to the entry of the order of fi-
nal approval are treated differently. Section 8(b) gives the
surrogate the absolute right to terminate at any time prior to
the birth of the child. She must provide written notice to the
proposed parent(s) using any of the methods stated therein and
file a copy with the court. The court will thereupon enter an
order terminating the agreement and vacating its prior orders
of approval. If the surrogate is pregnant at the time, she is to
be considered the legal mother of the child, and her husband,
if he was a party to the parenting agreement, becomes the
legal father, unless paternity is established in another individ-
ual who was not a party to the agreement. In this situation,
the statute does require that the surrogate repay the proposed
parent(s) all amounts they have spent on her behalf and on
their own behalf, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
The issue of at what point a surrogate mother can terminate
a parenting agreement is a complex one because it is inextrica-
bly tied in with the related question of termination of her
parental rights under the agreement. The proposed Act essen-
tially treats the two as co-extensive. In other words, because
the surrogate mother has the right to change her mind for
seventy-two hours after childbirth (or up to thirty-three days
after birth if Section 9(g) applies) and can effectively terminate
the agreement at that point by retaining custody of the new-
born, it follows logically that she should have the same right
prior to the birth to end the contract simply by sending notice.
This is also true for those provisions of the proposed Model Act
that give her and her physician of choice the sole decision-
making authority concerning the management of the preg-
nancy, including the right to an elective abortion. 299 Having an
abortion is an extra-contractual method of terminating the
pregnancy, but again, the end result is the same. That is also
why the court's final order of approval entered under Section
7(d) provides that the surrogate's parental rights with regard
299. MODEL ACT § 4(h).
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to the child to be conceived remain in effect until seventy-two
hours or thirty-three days after birth, whichever is applicable,
when they automatically terminate unless she elects to retain
custody under Section 9.
The entire statutory framework is predicated upon the notion
that, except for certain financial reimbursements to the pro-
posed parent(s), the surrogate mother can freely back out of the
agreement after going through childbirth, within certain time
parameters. These provisions of the statute have been included
to give her the maximum degree of leeway possible, so that she
is never made to feel that the child is being taken away from
her involuntarily. To reiterate, the proposed Model Act does not
view the surrogate parenting agreement under traditional
contract standards, which would not put the proposed parent(s)
in such a relatively precarious position,"°0 but analyzes the
proposed transaction under the auspices of family law using
the adoption analogy.
In contrast, the Uniform Act is structured differently. Prior
to pregnancy, the surrogate can terminate the contract for any
reason, with proper notice.30 ' Once pregnant, however, the
surrogate who has provided the egg for assisted conception
under the parenting agreement has the right to decide to
terminate and keep the child only up to 180 days after the last
insemination pursuant to the agreement.0 2 The Comments to
these sections of the Uniform Act reject both the contract and
adoption models for surrogate parenting arrangements and use
the 180-day period because it roughly approximates the time
during which a surrogate has the constitutional right to have
an abortion, i.e., during the first two trimesters of the preg-
nancy.303 Beyond that time, the surrogate is irrevocably bound
to go through with the agreement.
The problem with this arrangement, aside from the obvious
fact that it does not permit withdrawal by the surrogate
mother after giving birth, is that it is unclear when the surro-
gate's parental rights are extinguished. No statement is made
in the Uniform Act to that effect. Section 5, entitled "Surrogacy
300. A contract that permits one of the contracting parties to withdraw unilaterally
would be unenforceable because it is based upon an illusory promise. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. a (1979).
301. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 7(a), 9b ULA 161-76
(Supp. 1995).
302. Id. § 7(b).
303. Id. § 7 cmt.
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Agreement," describes it as a written agreement, inter alia,
whereby the surrogate relinquishes all of her rights and duties
as a parent of a child to be conceived through assisted concep-
tion. °4 The court order provided for in Section 6 is also silent
on the timing of the relinquishment of parental rights, al-
though it does state in 6(b) that the order approving the
surrogacy agreement also should declare that the intended
parents are the parents of a child to be conceived through
assisted conception pursuant to that agreement.0 5
Does the foregoing language mean that the parties can agree
that the surrogate's parental rights end at the time of concep-
tion of the child? Apparently not, because the Comments noted
earlier discuss the surrogate's constitutional right to an abor-
tion.30 6 Perhaps her parental rights terminate exactly 180 days
after conception. If that is the case, it would seem that the
proposed parent(s) would have the right to manage the preg-
nancy during that entire last trimester. This could easily lead
to conflicts between them and the surrogate that the Uniform
Act fails to address. For example, what if the surrogate does
not obtain proper prenatal care during this time? What if she
began smoking or drinking alcoholic beverages? Would the
proposed parent(s) have redress in the courts? It seems doubt-
ful that the surrogate mother would be subject to the tradi-
tional methods by which courts enforce their orders, that is,
through their contempt powers. Yet the Uniform Act seems to
contemplate such a procedure because it provides in Section
6(e) that the court conducting the proceedings has continuing
jurisdiction of all matters arising out of the surrogacy until
the child is 180 days old.
More serious conflicts could arise between the parties during
the last trimester. What if during the pregnancy unforeseen
problems develop that put the surrogate in danger, and her
physician recommends an emergency caesarean section in the
twenty-seventh week? Do the proposed parent(s) have the
right to choose the appropriate medical procedure in lieu of
the surrogate? Can they get an injunction if the surrogate
insists on following her doctor's advice? Scenarios such as
these have generated much criticism of the entire surrogacy
procedure. °7
304. Id. § 5(a), Alternative A.
305. Id. § 6(b).
306. See id. § 7 cmt.
307. See Dougherty, supra note 240, at 1587; Krimmel, supra note 27, at 37.
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Yet the Uniform Act fails to clarify what would occur in that
situation and leaves open the possibility that a private medical
decision involving a perfectly competent adult could be subject
to the veto of a third party or made by a court of law. Such a
result should not be permitted under any circumstances, and
that is one reason Section 7(d)(2) of the proposed Model Act
makes it clear that the surrogate's parental rights remain in
full force and effect throughout the course of the pregnancy.
Section 8(c) of the proposed Model Act covers the situation
in which the proposed parent(s) desire to terminate the agree-
ment after the court has entered its final order of approval.
Under Section 8(c)(1), the termination is sought prior to the
time the surrogate becomes pregnant, and the procedure
mirrors that described in Section 8(b). Written notice must go
to the surrogate as well as to the court that entered the final
order of approval. There is no hearing as such, but the court
only enters the termination order upon proof that all the
surrogate's expenses have been paid.
It is conceivable that after the surrogate becomes pregnant,
the parties might agree mutually to terminate the agreement
and permit the surrogate to keep the child. The procedure set
forth in Section 8(c)(2) is designed for this situation. Here, the
court has a more active role and does hold a hearing to ensure
that the surrogate mother voluntarily agreed to abandon the
contract without coercion or while under duress, because she
is the one who will now have to accept legal responsibility for
the child. Upon making such a finding, the court will enter an
order of termination of the surrogate parenting agreement,
vacate the final order of approval, and reinstate the surro-
gate's parental rights. The proposed parent(s) no longer will
have any responsibility for the child. The surrogate mother
will be considered the legal mother. Her husband, if he was a
party to the parenting agreement, will be the legal father
unless paternity is established in an individual who was not
a party to the agreement, in a separate proceeding under the
state's parentage laws.
SECTION 9. SURROGATE'S RIGHT TO RETAIN
CUSTODY OF CHILD
(a) For the first seventy-two (72) hours after giving birth,
the surrogate mother shall be entitled to remain with the
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child to the exclusion of the proposed parent(s), unless she
waives this right.
(b) During that period, the surrogate has the right to
exercise her choice to keep the child permanently as its
legal mother, notwithstanding the provisions of the surro-
gate parenting agreement. To effectively assert this right,
she shall provide written notice to either of the proposed
parent(s) (if more than one) at the address stated in the
final order of approval or to any subsequent address filed
with the court upon notice to all parties. Such written
notice of intent to retain the child shall be delivered in
person, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or in
any other manner of delivery of documents generally
accepted in commercial transactions. The surrogate's sig-
nature on such notice must be witnessed or notarized. The
notice must actually be delivered personally within the
seventy-two (72) hour period after birth, or deposited in
the United States mail or with such other delivery service
within the same time. A stamped receipt showing the date
and time of deposit of the surrogate's written notice shall
be prima facie evidence thereof. Service may be effected by
the surrogate herself, her spouse, her attorney, or any
other individual eighteen (18) years of age or older, who
has not been previously adjudged mentally incompetent.
The failure to adhere to all of the requirements contained
in this section will result in a waiver of the surrogate's
right to retain custody of the child, except as provided in
Section 9(g).
(c) The surrogate shall also provide a copy of the written
notice, with affidavit of service, to the court that entered
the final order of approval within seven days after service
of the notice.
(d) Upon receipt of such notice, the court shall schedule
a hearing to determine whether the surrogate mother has
exercised her right to keep the child in conformity with the
requirements of this Section. The surrogate mother shall
be represented by counsel at such hearing in the same
manner as described in Section 6(a). Such hearing shall be
placed on the court's calendar on an expedited basis and
will take precedence over all other matters. The court's
final order in such hearing shall be entered within thirty
(30) days after the commencement thereof. The surrogate
mother shall retain custody of the child during the hearing.
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(e) If the court determines that the surrogate mother has
complied with the notice provisions of Section 9(b) it shall
enter an order as follows:
(1) Vacating its previous order terminating the paren-
tal rights of the surrogate;
(2) Declaring the surrogate parenting agreement to be
void ab initio;
(3) Providing that the surrogate mother is the legal
mother of the child under [the parentage laws of this
state];
(4) Stating that the proposed parent(s) have no legal
responsibility for the child;
(5) Providing that if the surrogate is married and has
the same husband that she did at the time of entering into
the surrogate parenting agreement, her husband is the
legal father of the child, unless another individual, exclud-
ing the proposed father or donor, is shown to be the legal
father in a paternity proceeding;
(6) Ordering [the applicable state agency] to issue a
birth certificate in the name of the surrogate as mother
and her husband, if any, as father, unless a different
father has been established, who shall be named on the
certificate; and
(7) Requiring the surrogate to repay all costs and ex-
penses paid on her behalf by the proposed parent(s), in-
cluding her parenting fee, plus all costs incurred by the
proposed parent(s) on their own behalf pursuant to the
surrogate parenting agreement, including reasonable
attorneys' fees.
(f) If the court determines that the surrogate has not
complied with the notice provisions of Section 9(b), it shall
order the surrogate to immediately turn over custody of
the child to the proposed parent(s).
(g) Notwithstanding anything stated to the contrary in
Sections 9(a)-9(f), the surrogate mother may deliver notice
of her intent to retain custody of the child beyond the
period set forth in Section 9(b) if she has experienced any
medical or psychological condition that prevents her from
acting within the seventy-two (72) hour period after birth.
In that case, the beginning of the seventy-two (72) hour
period is tolled until the precipitating event or condition
has been ameliorated to the point that she has become
capable of providing the required notice, provided, howev-
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er, that the tolling provided herein shall not exceed thirty
(30) days from the date of the child's birth. If the surrogate
mother has not provided written notice of her intent to
keep the child within a maximum of thirty-three (33) days
from the date of birth, the provisions of Section 9(g) shall
no longer apply and the proposed parent(s) shall be enti-
tled to immediate custody of the child regardless of the
surrogate's mental or physical condition.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 9
Section 9, which has been referred to several times previ-
ously, is consciously patterned after adoption laws.3"' After
the child's birth, the surrogate is entitled to spend the first
seventy-two hours with the newborn to the exclusion of the
proposed parent(s) unless she agrees to let them see the baby.
During that period, notwithstanding anything that has tran-
spired previously, the surrogate has the right to decide to
keep the child as its lawful mother. In order to take advan-
tage of this choice, she must strictly comply with the notice
and other provisions set forth in Section 9(b). Compliance may
be had by providing written notice to either of the proposed
parent(s) in the manner provided. The notice must bear the
notarized or witnessed signature of the surrogate mother;
otherwise the statute does not prescribe any particular form
of notice. A statement to the effect of, "I've changed my mind"
or "I want to keep my baby" is sufficient.
Section 9(b) does not require that the attempt at service be
successful in order for the surrogate to have complied with the
statute. In other words, if she sends notice of her election by
certified mail or other delivery service to the address of the
proposed parent(s) stated in the final order of approval within
the seventy-two hour period, she has met the requirements of
308. Cf. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Ky. 1986) (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.601(2) (re-
pealed by Acts 1986, Ch. 423, § 198; current version at § 625.040), 199.500(5) (Michie
1995), which give the biological mother five days after birth to change her mind
about surrendering her child for adoption). Likewise, section 9B of the Illinois
Adoption Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/9 (West 1995), which does not permit a
birth mother to consent to adoption within the first 72 hours after birth, and permits
the natural father of the child to revoke his prior consent to the adoption by written
notice within that initial 72 hour period.
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the law. The fact that service was refused or even that the
notice was delivered to the wrong address by mistake has no
effect upon its validity. The law requires only that the sur-
rogate mother take certain actions to change her mind effec-
tively about keeping the baby; once she has done that, events
that are out of her control will not change the result. Notice
also must be sent to the court within seven days of the delivery
to the prospective parent(s).
A hearing will be scheduled on an expedited basis and must
be completed within thirty (30) days. This time limit was in-
serted to avoid situations where a child is temporarily in the
custody of one "parent" for a lengthy period of time and then
is given over to a different "parent" pursuant to court order.
Should the court determine that the surrogate mother did not
properly exercise her statutory right to retain the child, the
transfer of custody to the proposed parent(s) should occur
within the first six or seven weeks of life and hopefully will
minimize any psychological disruption that the child might
experience. At the hearing, the court will determine whether
the surrogate has complied with all of the requirements of
Section 9(b) but is not allowed to second-guess her reasons for
wanting to keep the child.
If the court makes the requisite findings, it will enter an
order vacating the final order of approval of the surrogate
parenting agreement, restoring the surrogate's parental rights,
providing that the surrogate is the legal mother of the child,
declaring that her husband, if he is the same man to whom she
was married when the parenting agreement was executed, is
the legal father, unless paternity is established in another
individual who was not a signatory to that agreement, and
requiring that the surrogate repay the proposed parent(s) for
all amounts previously paid on her behalf and for all expenses
they incurred on their own behalf, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees. The court will then order the appropriate state
agency to issue a birth certificate establishing the surrogate
as the legal mother and her husband (or whomever else) as the
legal father, as the case may be.
If the surrogate mother is unable to demonstrate to the
court's satisfaction that she provided notice of her decision to
retain custody of the child in a timely manner, the court will
order her to relinquish possession to the proposed parent(s).
There is no special significance to the seventy-two hour period
provided for in the proposed Act; it could be increased or even
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decreased as each state determines. The exception built into
the statute in Section 9(g), an exception that could increase
that time period in the event of special medical circumstances,
is intended to cover the unusual situation in which the surro-
gate mother is physically or psychologically unable to provide
the notice within the initial seventy-two hours. For example,
situations could arise where, because of complications in the
pregnancy or delivery, she is heavily medicated for the entire
three-day period and is incapable of making a rational choice.
Or perhaps the child is delivered by a last-minute caesarean
section and complications result, leaving her unconscious for
several days. There are many possible scenarios in which the
surrogate would be incapable of delivering the notice of her
decision within the statutory time limit. If that does occur, the
court will have to determine at what point in time she recov-
ered sufficiently so as to regain the ability to act, up to a
maximum tolling period of thirty (30) days after birth. This
time limit also represents an additional effort to reduce the
potential psychological disruption experienced by the child.
SECTION 10. PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
(a) A child born to the surrogate is presumed to have
resulted from non-coital reproduction using the proposed
father's or donor's sperm, as the case may be. Provided
that the surrogate has not chosen to retain custody of the
child, within ten (10) days after the time period for making
such a choice has terminated under Section 9(b) or 9(g),
whichever is applicable, the proposed parent(s) shall file
written notice of the birth with the court that entered the
final order of approval. The clerk of the court shall there-
upon send notice to all parties to the surrogate parenting
agreement advising them that in thirty (30) days the court
shall enter a judgment of parentage declaring the proposed
parent(s) to be the legal parent(s) of the child and termi-
nating any claim to paternity by the surrogate's husband,
if any, or by any other party. The notice shall further state
that any party objecting to the entry of such an order must
file a written objection with the court no later than seven
(7) days prior to the proposed date of entry and serve
copies thereof upon all parties to the surrogate parenting
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agreement. The clerk of the court shall also publish such
notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks prior to the
proposed date of entry of the order.
(b) If no timely objection is received by the court, then on
the date set forth in the notice it shall enter a judgment
declaring the proposed parent(s) to be the legal parent(s)
of the child born to the surrogate and shall direct [the
appropriate state agency] to issue a birth certificate nam-
ing the proposed parent(s) as the parent(s) of the child.
(c)(1) If a timely objection to the entry of such an order
is filed with the court, it shall conduct proceedings pur-
suant to [the parentage laws of this state] to determine the
biological father of the child.
(2) If the court determines that the objecting party is
not the biological father, it shall enter a judgment as stat-
ed in Section 10(b) and direct the issuance of a new birth
certificate. In such event, the objecting party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs of blood or other tests, incurred by the proposed
parent(s).
(3) If the court determines that the objecting party is
the biological father of the child, it shall enter a judgment
of parentage naming the surrogate and such party as the
child's legal parents, direct that a birth certificate be
issued accordingly, and vacate its prior order terminating
the surrogate's parental rights. If the biological father is
not married to the surrogate, the court shall determine
issues of custody, support, and visitation as otherwise
provided in [the parentage laws of this state].
(4) Where a donor was not used to impregnate the
surrogate mother, and the proposed father objects to the
entry of an order of parentage on the grounds that he is
not the biological father, this section shall apply in lieu of
Sections 10(c)(2) and 10(c)(3). In such event, the court
shall conduct proceedings to determine parentage as in any
other case. If the court determines that the proposed
father is the biological father of the child, it shall enter an
appropriate order of parentage and direct the issuance of
a birth certificate in the names of the proposed parent(s).
Should the court determine that the proposed father is not
the biological father of the child, it shall order the surro-
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gate's husband to undergo whatever blood or other tests as
are authorized by law to determine paternity [in this
state].
(A) If the test results show the biological father to
be the surrogate's husband, the court shall enter an appro-
priate order of parentage naming the surrogate and her
husband as legal parents of the child, vacate its order
terminating the surrogate's parental rights, and award
custody of the child to the surrogate and her husband.
(B) If the test results do not show that the surro-
gate's husband is the biological father, or if the surrogate
is unmarried, the court shall take the testimony of the
surrogate mother regarding the identity of the biological
father.
(C) If the court is able to determine the identity of
the biological father, it shall enter an appropriate order of
parentage, vacate its order terminating the surrogate's
parental rights, and decide issues of custody, child support,
and visitation as in all other cases under [this state's par-
entage laws].
(D) If the court is unable to determine the identity
of the child's biological father, it shall award custody to the
surrogate mother, enter an order of parentage naming her
as legal mother without a designation of the father, and
vacate its order terminating her parental rights rights.
(E) In all proceedings under Section 10(c)(4), the
proposed parent(s) shall retain custody of the child until
final disposition is made by the court.
(5) Except where a donor's sperm was used to impreg-
nate the surrogate, should the court determine that the
proposed father is not the biological father of the child, it
shall order the surrogate to repay the proposed parent(s)
all of the surrogate's expenses previously paid by them, to
return the parenting fee, and to reimburse the proposed
parent(s) for all of their legal and medical expenses, in-
cluding reasonable attorneys' fees incurred as a result of
entering into the surrogate parenting agreement.
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COMMENTS TO SECTION 10
As discussed earlier, typical surrogate parenthood arrange-
ments omit the proposed mother as a party to the surrogacy
contract. °9 Once the child is born and the surrogate mother
gives up custody, the proposed mother and father initiate
adoption proceedings so that the law will recognize the former
as the baby's legal mother. Recall that it was during these
adoption proceedings that the courts in In re Adoption of
Paul,310 and In re Baby Girl L.J,311 were confronted with the
public policy issues raised by surrogate motherhood.
Conflicts with state adoption laws that prohibit giving
consideration in connection with transferring custody of a
child is not the only area in which the practice of surrogacy
runs into difficulties with current statutory schemes. The
determination of the child's paternity is another area of con-
cern, one that Section 10 of the Act is designed to remedy. The
Uniform Parentage Act,312 originally promulgated in 1973,
establishes that a man is presumed to be the natural father of
a child if he and the child's mother are or have been married
to each other and the child is born or conceived during such
marriage.313 This presumption may be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence. 314 Thus, if a surrogate mother is
married, then her husband, rather than the proposed father,
is considered the legal father of the child. An action under the
Act would have to be brought to determine the correct child-
and-father relationship.
315
Section 10 of the proposed Model Act seeks to simplify the
parenting question by providing for a streamlined procedure
to take care of all these issues at one time. It presumes that
the child born to the surrogate resulted from non-coital repro-
duction pursuant to the surrogate parenting agreement. The
309. See supra note 2.
310. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990); see supra text accompanying notes
91-96.
311. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes
86-90.
312. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987 and Supp. 1995). For an analysis
of this law, see Hofheimer, supra note 52, at 584--86.
313. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a).
314. Id. § 4(b).
315. Id. § 6.
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court that entered the final order of approval is to be notified
within ten days of the child's birth. An order is to be auto-
matically entered in thirty days declaring that the proposed
parent(s) are the legal parents of the child. Public notice is
also to be given by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The order of parentage will be entered and a birth certificate
issued in the name of the proposed parent(s) unless there is an
objection filed at least seven days prior to the proposed date
of entry, in which event the court is to hold hearings to deter-
mine whether the objector is the biological father, as provided
in the state's parentage laws. If those tests reveal that the
objector is the natural father, the court will enter an order
naming him and the surrogate mother the legal parents and
will vacate its prior order terminating her parental rights; if
he and the surrogate are not married, the court will also
determine issues of custody and child support as in other cases
under the applicable laws of the state. Section 10(c)(4) estab-
lishes a separate procedure for the proposed father to object
where he believes he is not the biological father of the child.
In either event, where it is determined that the proposed
father is not the biological father and custody is turned over
to the surrogate, she must not only repay all amounts that the
proposed parent(s) paid to her but also must reimburse them
for all of their expenses incurred as a result of entering into
the parenting agreement, including their attorneys' fees.
Others have proposed that as a means of avoiding problems
of this nature, the parenting contract could contain the surro-
gate's agreement to refrain from sexual intercourse until she
becomes pregnant."' 6 While such a provision may be well-
intended, it involves the same enforcement problems as the
surrogate's agreement to obtain proper prenatal care. If courts
shy away from enforcing the provisions of personal service
contracts in general,317 it is doubtful that they would be in-
clined to get involved in a controversy over whether, how
often, and with whom the surrogate had sexual intercourse.
The surrogate is certainly aware that becoming pregnant in
any manner other than as contemplated by the surrogate
parenting agreement will defeat the purpose of the whole
arrangement and will be quite costly to her as well. One has
316. RAGONt, supra note 2, at 144 app. B.
317. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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to assume a certain amount of good faith on the part of all the
participants in an endeavor of this nature, and this is one of
those areas where good faith is about all that can be relied
upon. Inserting contract terms of this nature and attempting
to use the courts to enforce them are not likely to improve
surrogacy arrangements.
SECTION 11. REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CHILD
(a) Should the surrogate choose to turn over custody of
the child, the proposed parent(s) have an absolute duty to
accept custody regardless of its physical or mental condi-
tion.
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the proposed par-
ent(s) for any reason refuse to accept custody, the proposed
father, if any, shall be considered the legal father of the
child unless proceedings to determine paternity brought
under Section 10(c) determine otherwise.
(c) In all such cases, except where paternity is estab-
lished in someone other that the proposed father, the order
terminating the surrogate's parental rights shall be vacat-
ed, the surrogate shall be considered the legal mother of
the child, and custody shall be awarded to the surrogate.
Issues of child support and visitation shall be determined
under [the parentage laws of this state] as in all other
cases.
(d) In the event that the surrogate also declines to accept
custody, the child shall be turned over to [the appropriate
state agency] for placement for adoption. All costs incurred
by the state relative thereto shall be reimbursed from the
surety bond or letter of credit deposited by the proposed
parent(s) with the court.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 11
It is unfortunate that the proposed Model Act must include
a section governing the results of the proposed parent(s)'
refusal to accept the child born to the surrogate. As already
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pointed out, however, this situation has arisen more than once
in the short history of surrogate motherhood and could cer-
tainly occur again.318
Section 11(a) sets forth the absolute obligation of the pro-
posed parent(s) to accept custody of the child once the surrogate
has decided not to keep it during the first seventy-two hours
after birth. Should the proposed parent(s), in violation of the
statute, decline to accept the child, the statute will undo the
transaction and attribute parenthood along biological lines, i.e.,
the proposed father will become the legal father, unless paterni-
ty proceedings prove otherwise, and the surrogate will be the
legal mother. Basically, the proposed Act treats this situation
no differently than any other case where two people who are
not married to each other have a child together. Custody is
awarded to the surrogate if she will accept it, and the court is
to determine issues of child support and visitation under appli-
cable state law.
It is possible under these circumstances that the surrogate
might also refuse custody. After all, she entered into this ar-
rangement for the express purpose of giving up the child after
it was born. She may feel that she already has enough chil-
dren of her own to care for or, for any other reason, might not
want another child. The proposed Model Act respects her right
to make this choice and does not attempt to force a child upon
her. In Section 11(d), where the surrogate mother will not
accept custody, the child is to be put up for adoption. The pro-
posed parent(s), who violated their statutory duty initially by
refusing custody, will reimburse the state for all costs incident
to placement for adoption using the surety bond or letter of
credit deposited with the court pursuant to Section 7(c).
SECTION 12. DEATH, LEGAL INCAPACITY
(a) If prior to the birth of the child, one of the proposed
parent(s) of a married or unmarried couple dies, is de-
clared legally incompetent, is voluntarily or involuntarily
committed to a mental health facility, or suffers any other
318. See supra note 267-69 and accompanying text.
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seriously debilitating form of physical or mental impair-
ment, the surrogate parenting agreement shall still remain
in full force and effect and the parental rights of the par-
ties thereto shall remain the same.
(b) If both proposed parent(s) of a married or unmarried
couple, or if an unmarried proposed parent experience(s)
any of the events described in Section 12(a) prior to the
birth of the child, and the surrogate thereafter declines to
retain custody pursuant to Section 9, the surrogate parent-
ing agreement shall be considered null and void and upon
the surrogate's so advising the court, it shall arrange for
the transfer of the child to [the appropriate state agency]
for placement for adoption. The expenses incurred by the
state in placing the child for adoption shall not be reim-
bursed by the surety bond or letter of credit supplied by
the proposed parent.
(c) In any case under Section 12(a) where one of the
proposed parent(s) dies before the child is born, and the
surrogate does not retain custody, the child shall be con-
sidered the natural offspring of the deceased proposed
parent and shall share in his or her estate in the manner
provided by law.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 12
This section is intended to deal with profound changes in
the physical or mental condition of one or more of the proposed
parent(s) between the time of final court approval of the
surrogacy contract and the birth of the child.
Section 12(a) deals with a situation where one member of
the proposed parent couple dies or becomes mentally or physi-
cally incapacitated. This is not viewed as a sufficient reason
to disturb the surrogacy arrangement because there is a
remaining parent who is available to take care of the child.
The situation described in Section 12(b) is different, however.
Here both members of the parenting couple, or the single
proposed parent, have either died, been declared legally
incompetent, are committed to a mental health facility, or
have otherwise become mentally or physically disabled. In this
scenario, no one is available to care for the newborn.
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One solution is that the surrogate can exercise her right to
keep the child as her own. But there is no guarantee that this
will occur, and it would be inappropriate to compel her to do
so for the same reasons given in the comments to Section
1 1(b)-she did not enter into this arrangement for the purpose
of having another child of her own, and the fortuitous circum-
stances affecting the proposed parent(s) should not change
that fact. In this situation, the proposed Model Act simply
provides that the child will be put up for adoption.
Consistent with these concepts, in the event of the death of
one proposed parent of a married or unmarried couple, the
child is considered the legal offspring of the deceased parent
and can inherit from him or her with the same rights as
natural children.
SECTION 13. LEGAL SEPARATION, DIVORCE
The child born to a surrogate shall be considered the
legal child of the proposed parent(s) notwithstanding that
they shall separate or file an action for dissolution of mar-
riage under [this state's dissolution of marriage laws] prior
to the child's birth. In such case, custody of the child, sup-
port obligations, visitation rights, and all other issues
concerning the child shall be determined in the same
manner as with any other child in a proceeding brought
under such laws.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 13
The legal separation or action for dissolution of marriage of
the proposed parent(s) prior to the birth of the child will have
no impact on the surrogacy arrangement. Assuming the surro-
gate does not assert her right to retain the child, the issues of
custody, child support, and visitation are no different than in
any other divorce situation with an infant. The issues can be
resolved under the state's existing dissolution of marriage
laws.
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SECTION 14. INABILITY OF SURROGATE TO CONCEIVE
Notwithstanding any language to the contrary contained
in a surrogate parenting agreement, a surrogate shall not
be required to undergo non-coital insemination more than
six (6) times over an eighteen (18) month period in an effort
to become pregnant. The surrogate may voluntarily agree
to undergo such additional procedures as often as she
chooses. If at any time after participating in at least six (6)
such attempts to be impregnated within this time period
the surrogate refuses to undergo any further procedures,
the surrogate parenting agreement shall be considered
terminated by operation of law and without further order
of court. In that event, all of the surrogate's expenses to
date shall be paid by the proposed parent(s), but the surro-
gate shall not be entitled to any part of the parenting fee.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 14
Naturally, there is no guarantee that the surrogate will be
able to become pregnant. Therefore, there must be some
outside limit on the extent to which she is required to attempt
to do so. This limit could be expressed in terms of a time com-
mitment, such as the one proposed in the Uniform Act, which
speaks of the court authorizing non-coital insemination for up
to one year.319
The proposed Model Act rejects that approach because a
temporal limit standing alone does not fully protect the surro-
gate's interests. In its place, the Act prefers to restrict the
number of attempts at non-coital reproduction that can be
undertaken within a specified period. There is no magic to the
formula of six attempts within an eighteen-month time frame;
people could certainly disagree about the reasonableness of
those numbers without violating the integrity of this statutory
section. But the overall approach of Section 14 provides a
319. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT § 6(b), 9b ULA 161-76
(Supp. 1995).
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better means of preventing the surrogate from being exploited
in the conception process.
SECTION 15. EFFECT OF UNLAWFUL
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENT
In the event that a child is conceived under an unlawful
surrogacy arrangement, the following shall apply:
(a) Any agreement between the parties to such arrange-
ment shall be void and unenforceable;
(b) The purported surrogate's parental rights shall not be
terminated, and she shall have no duty to surrender custo-
dy of the child;
(c) The purported proposed father of the child, including
any known donor, and the purported surrogate who gave
birth shall be considered the legal parents of the child
unless paternity is established in another individual in a
proceeding brought pursuant to [the parentage laws of this
state]; and
(d) Legal custody of the child, visitation, support obliga-
tions, and all other issues concerning the child shall be
determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of
[the parentage and dissolution of marriage law of this
state], as applicable.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 15
Even if the Act were to become law in every state in the
country, that would be no guarantee that some people would
not enter into surrogacy relationships on their own without
judicial sanction, in contravention to the requirements of the
statute. Section 15 makes it clear that any such agreements
will not be recognized. Instead, it treats the situation as if the
surrogacy arrangement did not exist. The proposed father and
the surrogate mother are the legal parents of the child absent
a different result established in a paternity proceeding. Issues
of custody, child support and the like are to be determined as
in any other case under applicable state law.
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SECTION 16. STATUTORY CONFLICT
In the event of a conflict between any of the provisions
of this Act and any other statute of this state, the provi-
sions of this Act shall govern.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 16
The purpose of Section 16 is to deal with the conflicts be-
tween the Act and those provisions of state adoption and
parentage laws which have already been discussed.320 In
particular, this section is intended to avoid the effect of laws
that: (i) prohibit the payment of money or other consideration
in connection with obtaining a child for adoption (even though
technically there is no adoption under Section 10(b)); (ii) pro-
hibit agreeing to terminate one's parental rights prior to the
birth of a child;32 (iii) those provisions of the parentage laws
that presume that a man is natural father of a child if he and
the mother are married;322 and (iv) laws providing that where
a married woman is artificially inseminated, her husband is
considered to be the father.323
There are undoubtedly additional provisions in existing state
laws that are inconsistent with one or more sections of the
Act. The explicit language of Section 16 providing for the
superiority of the Act's provisions over those of any other law
should be a sufficiently clear statement of policy to resolve any
possible disputes in statutory interpretation.
320. See supra notes 8, 18-20 and accompanying text.
321. No state currently allows a prospective parent to consent to her child's
adoption before the child's birth. Mandler, supra note 2, at 1292.
322. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287, § 4a (1987 and Supp. 1995).
323. E.g. Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2, 40/3 (West 1995);
Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5 (West 1995).
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SECTION 17. BREACH; REMEDIES
(a) Regardless of any language to the contrary contained
in a surrogate parenting agreement, the following are the
sole and exclusive remedies available to an aggrieved party
for breach of that agreement:
(1) Except in cases of related surrogacy, and notwith-
standing the provisions of Section 4(i), if the surrogate
fails to adhere substantially to reasonable medical instruc-
tions about her prenatal health, to submit to reasonable
medical evaluation and treatment during the course of her
pregnancy, or engages in other behavior that is detrimen-
tal to the fetus, and the surrogate miscarries or the child
is stillborn or is born mentally or physically impaired as a
direct and proximate result thereof, then the surrogate is
not entitled to payment of any part of the parenting fee or
expenses and shall repay any such amounts previously
paid to her. She shall also pay all of the proposed par-
ent(s)' expenses incurred on their own behalf under the
surrogate parenting agreement, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees. In any action brought by the proposed parent(s)
under this Section, the court shall not find in their favor
unless the surrogate's responsibility for the condition of
the fetus or the child, as the case may be, has been estab-
lished by the testimony of her physician or other expert
medical testimony to a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty. For purposes of this Section, the surrogate is
deemed to have waived any physician-patient testimonial
privilege otherwise provided by law.
(2) If the surrogate fails to turn over physical custody
of the child more than seventy-two (72) hours after its
birth without having elected to retain custody as provided
in Section 9, or within any additional time period provided
by Section 9(g), the proposed parent(s) shall be entitled to
obtain an order of court directing the surrogate to surren-
der custody forthwith. Any such order entered by the court
shall also provide that the surrogate shall have forfeited
the right to be paid any part of the parenting fee and shall
direct her to refund any portion thereof previously paid.
(3) Except in cases of related surrogacy, if the proposed
parent(s) fail to pay any of the surrogate's expenses in a
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timely manner or fail to pay the parenting fee in the
manner required under the surrogate parenting agreement,
the surrogate may obtain an order of court authorizing her
to seek payment thereof under the surety bond or letter of
credit posted with the court by the proposed parent(s)
pursuant to Section 7(c) of this Act.
(b) Any action filed by the proposed parent(s) or the
surrogate for breach of the surrogate parenting agreement
as provided in this Section 17 shall be brought in the court
which entered the final order of approval of the agreement.
The prevailing party in such proceeding shall be awarded
its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 17
The unique nature of the surrogate parenting arrangement
means, among other things, that many traditional doctrines of
contract law will not be appropriate in this context. Moreover,
unless restrained by statute, the proposed parent(s) have a
strong incentive to provide in the surrogate parenting agree-
ment that the surrogate waives her right to an abortion, that
the parents are entitled to specific performance of the surro-
gate's agreement to obtain proper prenatal care, and other
unenforceable provisions. The proposed Model Act will not
permit language of this nature, as already has been discussed
in some detail. 24
As a corollary, the Act in Section 17 establishes its own
limited scheme of recovery for breach of the surrogate parent-
ing agreement. These remedies are in addition to those other
provisions throughout the law that require the surrogate to
forfeit her fee, repay all expenses paid on her behalf, and even
reimburse the proposed parent(s) for their own expenses. This
result ensues, for example, if the proposed father is determined
not to be the biological father of the child, if the surrogate
chooses to keep the child, or if the surrogate terminates the
agreement after the order of final approval.325
324. For a discussion of these issues, see supra text accompanying notes 265-66
and 268-83.
325. See MODEL ACT § 8(b).
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Section 17(a)(1) addresses the problem of prenatal behavior
on the part of the surrogate mother. As noted earlier, the Act
relies upon economic incentives to achieve the desired behav-
ior and does not provide for the use of the court's equitable
powers. To the extent the surrogate does not get proper prena-
tal care during pregnancy, and a miscarriage, stillbirth, or
mentally or physically disabled child is the direct result, as
established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty by her
physician or other medical expert, the surrogate will suffer
severe financial consequences.
This part of the statute mirrors Section 4(f), whereby the
parties may provide in the parenting agreement for a mone-
tary reward if the surrogate does obtain proper care and
refrains from behavior that would endanger the fetus. The use
of these monetary incentives does not represent any philo-
sophical bias towards freedom of contract or market-type
mechanisms in the surrogacy context. Rather, these methods
are viewed as the least objectionable method of achieving the
goals in question. As already demonstrated, to have the court
intervene by issuing an injunction is a useless act because the
personal nature of the behavior involved makes it impossible
to enforce.326
Ultimately, whether or not the surrogate mother gets proper
prenatal care depends primarily on whether she acts in good
faith in carrying out her duties and responsibilities under the
Act as a whole. The real solution here lies in the choice of the
proper surrogate by the proposed parent(s). The Act gives
them plenty of opportunity to make that choice by requiring
disclosure of considerable information about the surrogate in
the preliminary and final hearings in court. Once that final
approval is granted, as a practical matter there is very little
anyone can do to make sure the parties live up to the non-
monetary responsibilities provided for in their agreement.
Under Section 17(a)(2), the proposed parent(s) can obtain an
order of court where the surrogate refuses to transfer custody
of the child after the seventy-two hour period has passed
subsequent to the child's birth, or if Section 9(g) applies,
custody is not turned over after any extension of that time
period. In this context the court's intervention is appropriate
because there is no other mechanism by which the parent(s)
326. See supra text accompanying note 265.
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can get the child back; obviously, damages for breach of con-
tract are not sufficient to make them whole.
Section 17(a)(3) provides a remedy to the surrogate if the
proposed parent(s) fail to live up to their obligation to pay her
expenses or parenting fee. Upon application to the court, the
surrogate can obtain payment by proceeding directly against
the surety bond or letter of credit posted with the court pursu-
ant to Section 7(c).
SECTION 18. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
Any health care provider who performs health care
services for any party pursuant to a surrogate parenting
agreement that has been given final approval by the court
hereunder shall not be liable in any manner, nor face any
penalty or sanction solely as a consequence of acting in
that capacity; provided, however, that (s)he shall remain
liable as in all other cases for acts of negligence or inten-
tional misconduct.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 18
Section 18 is designed to protect health care providers from
the imposition of liability or any other sanction, such as pro-
fessional censure, for providing services to a participant in an
approved surrogacy agreement. Should they commit any acts
of negligence while acting in that capacity, they will remain
liable as otherwise.
SECTION 19. JURISDICTION; VENUE
The circuit courts [of this state] shall have jurisdiction
of all actions brought under this Act, provided that the
proposed parent(s) and surrogate have been residents [of
this state] for at least two (2) years. The action may be
brought in the county in which any petitioner resides.
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COMMENTS TO SECTION 19
This section on jurisdiction performs the important func-
tion of obviating any conflict of laws problem by virtue of its
two-year residency requirement for the proposed parent(s)
and the surrogate. It is not inconceivable that parents who
are desperate to have a child will travel to any state where
the requirements for surrogate motherhood have been re-
laxed somewhat. A woman who very much wanted to be a
surrogate mother might also do the same. The Act is not in-
tended to promote interstate trafficking in would-be proposed
parent(s) and surrogate mothers looking for a hospitable
legal environment. The two-year residency requirement ought
to be long enough to ensure that the party has resettled in
the state for legitimate reasons having nothing to do with
surrogate motherhood.
SECTION 20. APPLICATION OF ACT
This Act shall apply to all surrogate parenting agree-
ments entered into after its effective date, regardless of the
genetic relationships between the child to be conceived
under the agreement and any of the parties thereto.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 20
By virtue of the language of Section 20, the Act will apply
only to surrogate parenting agreements entered into after its
effective date; it will not be applied retroactively. To the
extent there are any parenting agreements in existence at the
time the Act becomes law, it would be difficult to apply its
provisions to such contracts, especially if the surrogate is al-
ready pregnant. Only allowing for prospective application will
make the new law easier to administer. A state could provide
that the law also applies to any parenting agreement in
existence where the surrogate has not yet conceived because
the time constraints of an ongoing pregnancy are not a factor
in that situation.
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The latter half of the Section is intended to make it clear
that genetic relationships are irrelevant to the application of
the Act. In other words, there is no requirement that the
proposed father be the biological father of the child. This may
be the most common surrogacy situation, but it is not the only
type. A sperm donor might be used in conjunction with a
surrogate mother where both members of a couple are infer-
tile. Recall that in Johnson v. Calvert327 the surrogate was
carrying a child that bore no genetic relationship to her at all;
it had been conceived using IVF with the husband's sperm and
the wife's egg.32' As far as the proposed Model Act is con-
cerned, it makes no difference how the surrogate becomes
pregnant. Once a surrogate mother is involved in any capacity,
the statute will apply.
SECTION 21. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Act takes effect on
COMMENTS TO SECTION 21
The effective date of the Act is left blank because the enact-
ment of the law presumably would occur at different times in
the various states and each can decide for itself when the Act
is to take effect.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, there would be no need for surrogate motherhood,
and all people who wanted children could have them without
difficulty. But the law cannot afford the luxury of sitting on
the sidelines, wishing for a more idyllic state of nature while
in the real world men and women continue to enter into sur-
rogate parenting arrangements with potentially disastrous
327. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
328. Id. at 778.
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results. It has only been a short time since advances in medi-
cal technology first made assisted reproduction a realistic
alternative for the treatment of infertility. Yet in that short
time tragic results have already ensued when the technology
was put to use in a surrogacy context.
It is perhaps understandable that in an effort to prevent the
recurrence of situations which arose in In re Baby M'29 and in
Johnson v. Calvert,"° some state legislatures would react by
outlawing commercial surrogate motherhood, even to the
extent of subjecting the participants to civil or criminal penal-
ties.331 This is an overly simplistic approach, however, which
fails to take into account how desperate some people become
in their effort to have children. It will succeed only in either
driving the practice underground 3 2 or compelling people to go
to states where surrogacy has not been outlawed. Either result
will guarantee the occurrence of future tragedies similar to
those already seen.
33 3
Even if we could eliminate surrogacy, are there compelling
reasons to do so? It would seem that society has an interest in
fulfilling the desires of people who want to have children so
badly. In marked contrast to the problem of unwanted children
who can be subjected to terrible abuse, one would think that
the children of surrogacy arrangements would be especially
cherished by their parents. The creation of new families where
the bond between the parent and child is so powerful furthers
the societal goal of strengthening family life.
It is the commercial nature of the typical surrogacy arrange-
ment and the potential treatment of children as mere commod-
ities that causes this practice to come under such criticism and
329. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
330. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
331. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63.212(5) (Harrison 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.857(2)(West 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV)(1995); N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 123(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165 (Michie 1995). These
laws ban the activities of commercial brokers who for a fee act as middlemen by
matching childless clients with surrogate mothers. The above New York law, for
example, imposes a fine of$10,000 for the first such offense; any subsequent offenses
are punishable as felonies. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 123(2)(b). The Act takes no position
on the activities of commercial brokers because the resolution of this issue involves
policy considerations that go well beyond the scope of this Article.
332. FIELD, supra note 2, at 61; Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of
Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811, 1819 n.21 (1988).
333. E.g. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988).
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has led to efforts to make it illegal.134 This Article is based
upon the premise that we must accept the fact that commer-
cial surrogacy is a fait accompli. Instead of engaging in futile
efforts to eliminate it, we ought to act to minimize its objec-
tionable aspects while retaining its positive qualities. This can
be accomplished by imposing judicial supervision in a manner
similar to an adoption proceeding while at the same time
recognizing the unique aspects of the surrogacy relationship,
which call for special protections to be provided for the surro-
gate mother.
Consistent with that philosophy, the Act does not apply
traditional principles of contract law to the surrogate parent-
ing agreement. The proposed parent(s)' rights created by that
agreement are limited by the surrogate mother's desire to keep
the child she bore. In this way, the Act makes clear that
surrogacy arrangements are not equivalent to ordinary com-
mercial transactions precisely because fertile women, and chil-
dren, are not fungible commodities that can be bought and
sold.
Unfortunately, to a certain extent the proposed parent(s) are
the innocent victims of this legislative scheme. No doubt it
would be emotionally devastating to go through the whole
surrogacy process only to lose all rights to the child once it is
born. But the same risks are inherent in the adoption process
and indeed in natural conception as well-pregnant women
have miscarriages, stillbirths, etc. At least under the Model
Act, if the surrogate mother decides to keep her baby, Section
9 requires that she repay the proposed parent(s) for all ex-
penses they have incurred since the beginning of the relation-
ship. This provision is another example of the statute's intent
to balance the benefits and hardships experienced by all
parties to the surrogate arrangement.
It can hardly be gainsaid that surrogate motherhood is an
imperfect solution to the problem of infertility. The Proposed
Model Surrogate Parenthood Act is one attempt to remedy
those imperfections so as to minimize their negative impact
upon people's lives. Hopefully, by promoting humanistic values
over commercial ones, the statute will contribute to a prevail-
ing ethos that treats all people with dignity, respect, and
334. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. Inc., v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209, 215-16 (Ky. 1986) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting), see also supra notes
83-85.
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compassion as modern technology continues to forge ahead
into the uncharted waters of human reproduction.

